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INTRODUCTION

It is a common mistake to view disability discrimination as mere
thoughtlessness or failure to take extra steps to accommodate the
unique needs ofpeople with disabilities.' In reality, much disability
discrimination is the overt expression of hostility and the conscious
effort to subordinate members of a group with less power and social
standing than the majority. A key example of intentional discrimination against individuals with disabilities2 is harassment on
the basis of differences in physical or mental characteristics.
Courts, however, wedded to the idea that disability discrimination
is the mere failure to accommodate, frequently fail to take seriously
the damage that harassment inflicts and refuse to provide an
adequate legal response.
Nowhere is the injury more common or more severe than in
elementary and high schools. A few cases illustrate this point.
Robert Kubistal was a seventh grader with an undiagnosed visual
impairment.' His teacher routinely called him "butthead" and said
she would like to take out his eyes and give them to a child who
would work harder. His mother complained to Robert's principal
and ultimately to the Board of Education. After the principal
assured Robert's mother that the teacher would apologize if
necessary, the teacher called Robert up to the front of the class, got
1. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) ("Discrimination against the
handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious
aninaus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference

.... ").

Justice Marshall, who

described this congressional view, was himself quite fully aware ofthe "grotesque" legacy of
intentional segregation and discrimination against people with mental retardation. See City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,461 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 n.12 ("To be sure, well
catalogued instances of invidious discrimination against the handicapped do exist.").
2. Terms such as "individual with disabilities" and "people with disabilities" seem
awkward at first, but they convey the important idea of placing the person first and the
condition second-thus the usage is employed by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and other recent statutes. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000) (Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (ADA); see also JIMRYAN, MANUAL OF STYLE FOR
DEPICTING PEOPLE WrrH DIsABIuTIEs 2 (2001) (giving usage guidelines), available at
http://www.ag.state.il.us/publicationslmanualstyle.htm.
3. Kubistalv. Hirsch, No. 98 C 3838,1999 WL 90625, at*1 (N.D. IMI.Feb. 9,1999). This
account assumes that the plaintiffs' allegations are true-an assumption the court was
required to make.
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down on her knees and in an exaggerated voice said, "I'm so sorry,
Bobby!"4 She then turned to the class and stuck a finger in her
throat to mimic inducing vomiting. At some point the next year,
after the visual impairment was diagnosed, Robert was moved to
another teacher's room. During that time, the principal came to the
classroom and erected an "isolation chamber"5 for Robert with
movable bookcases. Robert sat in the isolation chamber every day
for several weeks, including during his lunch period. Robert's
mother complained to the teacher, who said the principal was
responsible, so she then complained to the principal, who said the
teacher was responsible. Robert graduated despite never having
been assigned eighth grade work. At the ceremony, the graduation
marshal skipped over Robert's name, looked at Robert's mother,
giggled, and finally said, "Oh, Robert Kubistal." As a result of these
from depression, bed-wetting, and
humiliations, Robert suffered
6
school.
in
interest
lost
Charlie F. was a fourth grader with attention deficit disorder
and was prone to panic attacks.7 Every week, his teacher held
sessions in which she asked her students to discuss their feelings.
She repeatedly asked them to discuss Charlie and his behavior,
"and they all too willingly obliged, leading to humiliation, fistfights,
mistrust, loss of confidence and self-esteem, and disruption of
Charlie's educational progress."8 Although the teacher instructed
the students to keep the sessions a secret, the truth came out.
Charlie's parents moved him to another school, but children from
the seventh-grade class still taunted and ridiculed him when they
ran into him outside school. 9
Shawn Witte was a ten-year old with Tourette's syndrome,
asthma, attention deficit disorder, an emotional disability, and
deformities of the feet and legs.' At school, his teacher forced him
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id. at *3.
6. Id. at *1-*3.
7. Charlie F. v. Board of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 1996). This account is taken
from the plaintiffs' allegations reported in the opinion.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1999). Again, this
account is based on the plaintiffs' allegations.
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to eat oatmeal, though his mother had told the teacher that Shawn
was allergic to it. The teacher and an aide force-fed Shawn, one of
them holding his hands behind his back while the other spooned
him oatmeal mixed with his own vomit. The principal was aware of
the practice and explained it to Shawn's mother as a form of
punishment. To punish Shawn for not running fast enough during
an exercise period, the aide choked him, causing an emergency
room visit in which the physician diagnosed strangulation. When
Shawn made involuntary body movements due to tics, the teacher
and aides tackled and sat on him. The staff placed Shawn on a
treadmill with weights attached to his ankles in an effort to tire
him out and keep him from leaving the classroom. At times, Shawn
was punished for failing to perform tasks by being deprived of
meals or having water sprayed on his face. The teacher screamed
degrading remarks at Shawn. Shawn was also forced to write the
sentences "I will not tell my mom" and "I will not tic."1 He was
threatened with physical harm if he ever told his mother about
what was happening at school.12
In two of the three cases just described, the courts dismissed
claims for damages, and in the third the trial court did so.'" As will
be discussed below, courts innumerous cases have dismissed claims
based on abuse by teachers or on toleration of peer harassment by
principals and other school officials. They have cited a variety of
groinds: failure to state a constitutional or statutory claim,' 4 failure
to exhaust administrative
remedies, 5 and failure to surmount
immunity defenses. 6 Not all courts have joined this chorus. Many
have recognized that harassment is a violation of legal rights for
which a damages remedy is appropriate. But the pattern of failing
to take disabilityharassment seriously is apparent, and it contrasts

11. Id. at 273.
12. Id.
13. Compare CharlieF., 98 F.3d at 993 (remanding case with instructions to dismiss),
and Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98 C 3838, 1999 WL 90625, at *7 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 9, 1999)
(dismissing case), with Witte, 197 F.3d at 1276 (reversing dismissal). As the parenthetical
indicates, in the third case the trial court dismissed the action but was reversed on appeal.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 49-52, 187-90.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 290-95.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 318-26.
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sharply with the current heightened awareness of sexual and racial
harassment claims.
Just as courts have frequently failed to take disability harassment seriously, scholars have rarely addressed the topic, and when
they have done so they have focused primarily on harassment in the
workplace, rather than in schools.1 7 On a more general level,
however, the embryonic study of disability harassment is part of the
rapidly growing scholarly project of applying a minority-group
model to discrimination against people with disabilities.18 This
approach takes the conceptualization of disability away from a
medical model in which people with disabilities have impairments
that need to be fixed or adjusted for the person with the disability
to fit into society.19 The movement is towards recognition that
conditions and attitudes everyone takes for granted operate in
discriminatory ways against people with disabilities, just as other
conditions and attitudes that oppress other minority groups in
society. 20 To end discrimination, society needs to change those
17. Afew authors have addressedworkplace disabilityharassment. Susan Stefan, "You'd
Have to Be Crazy to Work Here". Worker Stress, the Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the
ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795,796-99 (1998) (collecting cases involving abusive workplaces);
Mark C. Weber, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Employment:A Non-Retrospective,
52 ALA. L. REV. 375,398-406 (2000) (discussing disability harassment claims in employment
context); Eric Matusewitch, CourtsAre Recognizing Claimsfor Hostile Work Environment
Under ADA, ANDREWS EMPLOYMENT LITIG. REP., March 24, 1998, at 3 (discussing nature of
claim).
18. See Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, DisabilityBeyond Stigma: Social Interaction,
Discrimination,and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 6-14 (1988) (developing and elaborating
on minority-group model of people with disabilities); Harlan Hahn, Advertising the
AcceptablyEmployable Image: Disabilityand Capitalism,in THEDISABILiTYSTUDIES READER
172, 174 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) (describing "minority-group model of disability"); see
also JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT Us WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND
EMPOWERMENT 127 (1998) (defending minority-group, civil-rights model of disability); SIMI
LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY 9 (1998) (describing oppression against people with
disabilities); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabledand the Law of Welfare, 54
CAL. L. REV. 809, 814-16 (1966) (applying civil rights approach to disability); Jonathan C.
Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of
FederalLegislation and Social Policyfor People with Disabilities,40 UCLA L. REV. 1341,
1357-58 (1993) (describing civil rights model of disability). For a discussion of the uses and
limits of this model, see Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A PostIntegrationistExamination,2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 902-15.
19. See, e.g., tenBroek & Matson, supranote 18, at 815-16 (criticizing medicalized model
of"custodialism" of people with disabilities).
20. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities:EducationalRights
and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUIKE L.J. 166, 183 (noting that artificial
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conditions.2 ' This Article contends that one condition in need of
change is disability harassment in the schools.22
Part I of this Article looks at the facts of harassment in public
schools. Part II examines how conduct that most observers would
agree to be harassing behavior should give rise to claims for
damages under a reasonable interpretation of the laws against
disability discrimination, special education laws, common law, and
the Constitution. Part III then considers defenses such as failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and various immunity doctrines.
The Article concludes in Part IV with a discussion of proposals for
modification of case law doctrines so that more courts will take
disability harassment seriously and provide adequate remedies for
it. Part I of this Article covers the facts; Part II the claims; Part III
the defenses; and Part IV the proposed legal reforms.
I. THE FACTS OF DISABILITY HARASSMENT

The reality of disability harassment can be discerned from the
reported cases on the subject and from everyday observations of
what happens in the public schools.
A. The Cases
The cases dealing with allegations of disability harassment in
the schools fall into several categories: first, outright physical
mistreatment and verbal abuse of highly vulnerable children by
school personnel; second, conduct by teachers that treats children
with disabilities unfairly and actively encourages fellow students to
join in the ridicule; and third, failure to provide protection against
environment and social constructs make bodily conditions disabling); see alsosupra note 18.
21. In developing feminist theory, writers and advocates have exposed how harassment,
including verbal intimidation and physical violence, reinforces the position of subordination
of women. E.g., CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, SEXUALHARASSMENTOFWORK[NGWOMEN 17492 (1979) (linking harassment to systematic subordination).
22. This Article will not attempt a comprehensive definition of disability harassment in
the schools. Harassment takes a variety of forms. It may come from teachers or from peers,
it may be a continuing pattern of conduct or a single incident, it may consist of verbal
assaults, physical violence, or both. No matter what its form, it deprives students with
disabilities of equal access to public education.
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known risks of physical or psychological harm by other students,
often including the risk of physical assault. Each category contains
cases that fail and cases that succeed in establishing a claim for
relief. This pattern itself supports an inference that courts do not
fully appreciate the gravity of the conduct and its character as a
form of disability discrimination.
Cases in the first category include, in addition to the Witte case
24 in which a child
described above,2" Franklinv. Frid,
with severe
cerebral palsy was assigned an aide at public school. The aide
"intentionally humiliated and tormented"2 5 Craig Franklin, poking,
hitting, and slapping him. She routinely yelled at him and called
him degrading names. The aide's supervisors did nothing to stop
the abuse, even after a psychological evaluation of the child
concluded that it was probable he had been repeatedly assaulted.26
Some other cases are, if anything, more troubling. In Covington v.
Knox County School System,2" a child with multiple mental and
emotional disabilities attended a public school's adaptive education
center. There he was routinely locked in a "vault-like" time-out
room for hours at a time without supervision. The room was fourby-six feet, dark, and unheated, with a concrete floor but no
furniture and no ventilation. There was one small reinforced
window five feet above the floor. At least once he was made to
disrobe before being locked in the room. At least once he was in the
room so long he had to relieve himself on the floor.28
In addition to Kubista 29 and Charlie F., 3 ° cases in the second
category include Bairdv. Rose,"' in which a high school girl, Kristen
Baird, was diagnosed with severe depression and placed on a
program of counseling and medication after a suicide attempt. Her
23. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999); see supra text
accompanying notes 10-12.
24. 7 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
25. Id. at 922.
26. Id.
27. 205 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2000).
28. Id. at 914.
29. Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98 C 3838, 1999 WL 90625 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 9, 1999); see supra
text accompanying notes 3-6.
30. Charlie F. v. Board of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996); see supratext accompanying

notes 7-9.
31. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
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mother informed a counselor at the school about the diagnosis, and
the counselor informed Kristen's teachers. The next day, the
teacher in Kristen's musical performance class announced to the
class that Kristen would not be permitted to participate in the next
performance and assigned her role to another student. After
Kristen's mother complained, the teacher told her that it was her
belief that individuals with depression could not be counted on to
meet their responsibilities.32
When the mother submitted letters from a doctor and
psychologist stating that Kristen was able to participate and would
suffer harm from exclusion, the teacher decided to exclude her on
the ground of several absences from class. 3 The principal informed
the teacher that if she were to take that action, she had to exclude
all students who exceeded the number of absences set in the
teacher's previously unenforced absences policy. Later, in Kristen's
presence, the teacher announced to the class that, against her will,
she was being forced to exclude three other students from part of
the performance. The teacher"then asked the class members if they
understood why she was being forced to adhere to the strict
attendance policy, and other students commented that someone
was taking advantage of the lax enforcement of the attendance
policy."3 Kristen left class crying uncontrollably and shaking, and
required tranquilization by a doctor. She ultimately was kept from
participating in many practice sessions and in all but a small part
of the performance. The effects of the humiliation continued,
including sleeplessness, fear of humiliation, symptoms of physical
illness, and academic decline. 5
The third category of cases, those concerning failure to supervise
students who present a known danger to students with disabilities,
includes numerous cases arising from incidents of sexual assault by
other students. In cases decided before 1999, claims based on these
occurrences were regularly dismissed.36 It is possible that some of
32. Id at 465.
33. Id. at 468.
34. Id, at 466.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no liability and
upholding immunity in case concerning sexual assaults at state school when child was
voluntarily enrolled there, despite superintendents knowledge of ongoing attacks); Larson
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these assaults would now be considered actionable as sexual
harassment in light of the Supreme Court's declaration in Davis v.
Monroe County Boardof Education7 that under sex discrimination
laws, a damages claim may be made for deliberate indifference to
known acts of peer sexual harassment at school. 8 Sutton v. Utah
School for the Deafand Blind 9 is a failure-to-supervise case sadly
typical on its facts but unusual in that the constitutional claim40 it
raised was sustained. James Sutton had severe cerebral palsy and
was mentally retarded, totally blind, and unable to speak.4 1 Though
fourteen, he had the mental development of a three- to five-year
v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding insufficient evidence to support
section 1983 or section 1985 conspiracy claims in case regarding sexual assault by school bus
driver); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding immunity and no liability
when child who was assaulted by another student was voluntarily enrolled at state school
for deaf); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding insufficient
support for section 1983 case against school district arising from sexual assault of student
by other students); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (finding insufficient support for section 1983 or section 1985 claim
against school district arising out of molestation of one student by other students); Hunter
v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Pa.), affd, 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993)
(granting school district's motion to dismiss section 1983 claim arising from drowning of
special education student).
37. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
38. Id. at 643 (establishing statutory liability for peer sexual harassment); see also Kelly
Dixson Furr, Note, How Well Are the Nation's ChildrenProtectedfrom PeerHarassmentat
School?: Title IXLiability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 78
N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2000) (noting likely difference in results in some cases after Davis).
See generally infra text accompanying notes 92-94, 111-13 (discussing Davis). Same-sex
harassment is actionable under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it is probable
that this rule will be extended to the school actions. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (recognizing statutory claim for same-sex harassment).
39. 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).
40. The case law has not shown instances in which assaults on vulnerable students with
disabilities are analyzed as disability discrimination in the sense that comparable assaults
engaged in by those with sex-based motivations or on the basis of racial hostility would be
approached as sex or race discrimination. As this Article contends, if a victim is selected on
account of his orher disability, the assault does constitute disability discrimination. See infra
text accompanying notes 70-121 (discussing statutory claims for disability harassment).
Because the theory has notbeen presented in the cases, the opinions generally do not discuss
to what degree the fact of the victim's disability (extreme vulnerability and low social
prestige, for example) motivated the attack, though in some instances it seems obvious that
the disability did. By and large, cases have been brought under theories of denial of
substantive due process for failure to afford adequate protection to those whose liberty is
limited, or on a state-created danger theory. See infra text accompanying notes 272-75
(discussing constitutional theories in assault cases).
41. Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1230.
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old.42 He was a day student at a state school. One day, he
communicated to his mother through sign language that a very
large boy who was not in his class had touched him in his genital
area while he was in the bathroom at school. James's mother
immediately notified the school superintendent, the principal, and
the teacher. She met with them the next morning and was assured
that the incident could not have occurred because students never
went to the bathroom without adult supervision. 3 A week later, a
teacher's aide escorted James to the door of the bathroom but left
to answer the telephone. After the call, she returned and discovered
that the same student James had previously described was sexually
attacking him. Following the occurrence, James suffered from
uncontrollable outbursts of rage, nightmares, compulsive behavior,
and other signs of acute mental distress.4
In Franklinv. Frid,5 the case of the violently abusive aide, the
court dismissed the claim for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, even though damages are unavailable in the administrative process and the parent had withdrawn the child from that
school system and enrolled him elsewhere. 6 In Covington, the case
regarding the time-out vault, 7 the court of appeals reversed a
dismissal on exhaustion grounds."8 In Baird v. Rose, the musical
performance case, 9 the court of appeals reversed the district court's
judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).50 In Sutton,51 the appellate
court also reversed the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a

42. Id. at 1240.

43. Id at 1230.
44. Id. at 1231.
45. 7 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 1998). For discussion of Frid, see supra text
accompanying notes 24-26.
46. Id. at 925.
47. Covington v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2000). For discussion of
Covington, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28.

48. Id. at 917-18.
49. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999). For discussion of Baird,see supra text accompanying

notes 31-35.
50. Id. at 468-70.
51. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). For
discussion of Sutton, see supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
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claim, in this instance a claim for violation of substantive due
process rights.5 2
The checkered pattern of results in the cases may show a fine
sensitivity to legal doctrine and the factual nuances of the cases.
This Article will seek to demonstrate, however, that the dismissals
are by no means compelled by existing doctrine and in reality are
contrary to a sensible application of the law.5" The fact that all of
the cases described lost on at least one level and that many more
cases also fail indicates, instead, that many courts simply do not
view disability harassment as a form of disability discrimination for
which damages are the logical remedy.5 Instead, the incidents
typically are viewed as aspects of disputes over levels of special
education services to be resolved by an administrative process, or
as unfortunate life experiences that simply must be borne in
silence." To use the phrase made popular with respect to sexual
harassment accusations in the Clarence Thomas confirmation
hearings, the judges "just don't get it."
B. OrdinaryExperience
Completely apart from the court cases, observations from daily
life show that disability harassment occurs constantly at school as
well as outside the schoolhouse gates, that it is a form of
discrimination, and that its effects are harmful and severe.
Flannery O'Connor once said, "Anybody who has survived childhood
has enough information about life to last him the rest of his days."5 6
Anyone who spent childhood in a public school in which special
education students attend with other students knows that the
children who are different are subjected to verbal abuse and
physical intimidation every day.57 Even some efforts by schools to
52. Id. at 1238-41.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 79-121 (discussing ADA claims for harassment);
272-82 (discussing constitutional claims); 283-317 (discussing exhaustion).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 122-60 (discussing damages remedies).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 283-317 (discussing administrative exhaustion).
56. THE COLUMBIAWORLDOFQUOTATIONS (Columbia University Press 1996), available
at http://www.bartleby.com/66/35/42835.html.
57. For a revealing personal narrative regarding the treatment by peers and teachers of
a deaf student in high school, see BONNIE POrrRAs TUCKER, THE FEEL OF SILENCE 31-35

2002]

DISABILITY HARASSMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

1091

increase disability awareness simply reinforce the message that
people with disabling conditions are to be gaped at or, at best,
pitied.5" The word "retard" has become a common insult on and off
the playground.5 9 Lines such as "I didn't ride the short bus" are
heard in everyday conversation. Students with disabilities,
particularly those with mental retardation and mental illness, and
those with disfigurements, are frequently objects of ridicule and
mistreatment. 0
The selection of incidents for litigation is itself revealing. The
cases are largely those in which school personnel have personally
engaged in the abuse or actively encouraged students to do so. No
one even bothers to sue over the far more common phenomenon of
continual verbal abuse and physical intimidation of students with
disabilities, particularly those with mental retardation, inflicted by
other students with the knowledge and tacit consent of teachers
and administrators.
Harassment is a form of discrimination. It reinforces hierarchies
of prestige and peer acceptance within the school setting. School
children with disabilities are significantly lower in social prestige
than other students.6 ' If a harasser can verbally tease or physically
intimidate a child with impunity, it reinforces a sense of power and
diminishes both the perceived and real power of the child who is
(1995).
58. See DonaAvery, FreaksonExhibit:ACriticalReviewEssayofLevinson andSt. Onge,
Disability Awareness in the Classroom, 20 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 348,349(2000). The author
criticizes teaching materials that include flashcard photographs of teenagers with various
disabling conditions and messages such as "If Raymond is gradually losing all his abilities,
do you think it's a blessing that he's also losing his mental awareness?" She concludes that
the messages delivered "by these cards and photos, and by the teachers who use them in
class, are perpetuating several stereotypes rather than helping to demystify disability ....
[The program] may actually crystallize the myth-understandings, as well as increase the
frequency of staring that an incoming disabled student will be made to endure." Id.
59. Judging from random eavesdropping on conversations among teens, the current
usage is, "He is so retarded!" to describe someone who has made a mistake or said something
naive.
60. See Engel, supra note 20, at 184 ("Physically disabled'persons are viewed with fear
and revulsion because they occupy an anomalous social position .... Stigma, fear of
contagion, stereotyping, and rejection have thus typified the responses of 'normal' society to
those labeled physically 'handicapped.'").
61. See Paul Sale & Doris.M. Carey, The SociometricStatusof Studentswith Disabilities
in a Full-InclusionSchool, 62 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 6, 16-17 (1995) (reporting attitude
study to this effect).
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harassed. In any context, school or work, harassment frequently
serves to reinforce lessons about who is in the accepted group and
who is in the out group. Vicki Schultz has observed how even sexual
harassment is often not at all sexual.6 2 It consists instead of
constant reinforcement of the message that the woman does
not belong in the position she occupies." Similarly, disability
harassment constantly reinforces the message that the child with
disabilities does not belong and that nothing he or she does can
change that reality. Unfortunately, the negative attitudes that the
children encounter at school are likely to follow them the rest of
their lives, harming them in the workplace and other settings.6 4 In
these settings as well, they will suffer harassment from peers and
supervisors because of mental and physical differences.6 5
Children cannot avoid reacting to harassment. Some children
who are teased and bullied by peers resist going to school and even
develop physical symptoms such as headaches and abdominal pain
to support their pleas to stay home.6 6 Hostility from teachers leads
62. See Vicki Schultz,ReconceptualizingSexualHarassment,107 YALEL.J. 1683,1720-28

(1998).
63. Id. at 1686-87; cf.Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassmentwith Respect, 111
HARV.L. REV.445,483 (1997) (proposing"respectful person" standard for sexual harassment
liability); Miranda Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got To Do With It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 567
(1995) (proposingreconfiguration ofsexualharassment as gender-based different treatment).

64. See Hugh Gregory Gallagher, 'Slapping Up Spastics": The Persistence of Social
Attitudes Toward People with Disabilities, 10 IssuES L. & MED. 401 (1995) (discussing
negative social attitudes towards persons with disabilities). Popular culture provides many
other examples, such as the recent controversy over the Nike advertisement describing an
injured trail runner as 'drooling, misshapen, ... forced to roam the Earth in a motorized
wheelchair with my name embossed on one of those cute little license plates you get at
carnivals.'" William McCall, Nike "Steps Over the Line": RunningShoe FirmPulls Magazine
Ad After Complaints,ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 26, 2000, available at http://more.abcnews.
go.coml sections/business/dailynews/nikeOO1026.html.
65. E.g., Easley v. West, No. CIV.A.93-6751, 1994 WL 702904, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13,
1994) (describing supervisor and co-worker abuse of employee with visual impairments);
Matusewitch, supranote 17 (describing harassment and negative stereotyping of workers
with disabilities).
66. Susan G. Parker, School Avoidance Often Signals Child Being Bullied, PEDIATRIC
NEws, June 1998, at 46 ("Children who refuse to go to school and present with somatic
symptoms like chronic headaches and abdominal pain may be victims of bullies."); Leslie Z.
Paige, School Phobia/SchoolAvoidance/School Refusal ("Many children [who refuse to
attend school] have social concerns and may have been teased or bullied at school ...
availableat http://www.ldonline.org/ldindepth/parentingnaspschool_avoidance.html (last
modified Dec. 27,2001).
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to the same fear and refusal to attend class.67 Not surprisingly,
children with disabilities have dropout rates three times those of
other children.6" That fact alone has severe consequences: The
unemployment rate for students with disabilities who drop out of
high school is forty percent higher than the rate for students with
disabilities who graduate.69
II. LEGAL CLAIMS BASED ON DISABILITY HARASSMENT

There are several sources of law under which claims for
disability harassment in the public schools can be analyzed: Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and title H of the ADA; the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); the common
law.; and the United States Constitution.
A. The RehabilitationAct and the Americans with Disabilities
Act
Disability harassment treats people with disabilities unequally
and unfairly; it is thus disability discrimination. Accordingly,
statutes barring disability discrimination are the logical starting
point in analyzing claims for disability harassment and
corresponding remedies.
1. Claims
The statutes and their regulations set out the standards for
liability for harassing conduct. An analogy to other anti67. DavidR. Branch,HelpingParentsDealWith Child'sSchoolRefusal,PEDIATRICNEws,
Mar. 1998, at 24 (noting link between school refusal and problem ofhostility from teachers).
68. U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., THE TRANSITION EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG PEOPLE WITH

DISABILITES:ASUmmARYOFFINDINGFROMTHENATONALLNGITUDINAL STUDYOFSPECIAL
EDUCATION STUDENTS 2-9 (1993).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IIPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT IV-15 (2000). The
data reflect similar trends regarding the population as a whole. See 143 CONG. REC. S4311-19
(daily ed. May 12, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reporting that high school dropouts
are more than three times as likely to be unemployed as high school graduates and that
dropouts constitute disproportionate percentage of welfare family heads and the prison
population).
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discrimination statutes and liability under those laws for other
forms of harassment gives depth to the discussion.
a. Statutory Liability
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 forbid discrimination on the
basis of disability in, respectively, federally funded activities and
activities of state and local government.7 0 Both statutes, as well as
their regulatory interpretations, bar disability harassment. Some,
but not all, violations might be compared to the kind of hostile
environment cases familiar to those who follow employment
discrimination case law.
(1) RehabilitationAct Section 504
Section 504 provides that no otherwise qualified individual with
a disability shall, "solely by reason of his or her disability, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 71 Public schools and state educational
agencies receive federal financial assistance, so the law covers
them.72 Students receive the protection of the law if they meet a
disability standard of having a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the person's major life activities,
have a record of such an impairment, or are regarded as having
such an impairment. 7' Regulations promulgated under section 504
further define the discrimination prohibited by the Act, barring
conduct that denies a person with a disability the opportunity to

70. The relevant statutes are section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12132 (1994). Section 504 forbids disability discrimination in federally funded activities (such
as public schools), and title II forbids disability discrimination in activities of state and local
government (such as public schools).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
72. RUTH COLKER & BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER, THE LAW OF DiSABI~rTY DISCRIMINATION

255 (3d ed. 2000).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
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benefit from services that are not equal to those provided
others,
74
and that are not as effective as those provided to others.
Disability harassment constitutes discrimination that violates
section 504 and its regulations. Being subjected to abuse either at
the hands of school personnel or at the hands of peers with the
knowledge of school personnel makes the public school experience
decidedly unequal to the experience of others. Harassment excludes
students with disabilities from the educational environment
provided to students without disabilities and discourages students
with disabilities from continuing their education beyond the
minimum period required by law.75
7 6 the case concerning
In Witte v. Clark County School District,
the force-feeding and other physical and psychological abuse, the
court overturned a dismissal of claims under Rehabilitation Act
section 504 and title H ofthe ADA.77 Although most of its discussion
centered on exhaustion, the court effectively approved a cause of
action for disability harassment under the two statutes.78
(2) ADA Title II
Title II of the ADA recapitulates the section 504 prohibition
against discrimination by public entities,7" and the definition of
banned conduct in the ADA regulations echoes that found in the

74. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b) (2001).
75. Students with disabilities have a much higher dropout rate than those without
disabilities. See supranote 68 and accompanying text.

76. 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999). For discussion of Witte, see supra text accompanying
notes 10-12.

77. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1272.
78. But see Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991). In
Waeehter, a recess supervisor forced a child whom the school knew had a heart defect to run
a 350-yard sprint as punishment for talking in class. The child suffered cardiac arrest and
died. The court dismissed a claim for violation of section 504, reasoning that the statute does
not provide damages relief.Id. at 1011. The court appeared to misread applicable section 504
precedent on this point. See infra text accompanying notes 122-60 (discussing damages relief
under section 504).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) ("Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.").
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section 504 regulations. 80 Although there are some technical
distinctions between the two laws, the only difference for purposes
of the current discussion is that title II extends section 504 coverage
to any public educational agency that somehow does not receive
federal money.8 '
Baird v. Rose, the case about the child with depression and her
exclusion from the musical performance class, 2 sustained a claim
for damages under title II of the ADA. The court stated that to
establish an ADA claim, three elements must be shown: that the
person has a disability, is otherwise qualified for the benefit at
issue, and was excluded from the benefit due to discrimination on
the basis of the disability." The court said there could be no dispute
that the plaintiff adequately alleged she had a disability and
was otherwise qualified to participate in the class.8 ' On the issue
of whether discrimination was on the basis of the student's
depression, the court ruled that plaintiffs had made sufficient
allegations to support a conclusion that the charge of absenteeism
was a pretext,8 5 and that the disability discrimination did not need
to be the sole cause of the adverse action, but only a motivating
factor.8" Applied to other cases of harassment, Bairdstands for the
proposition that if a child is treated in such a way that she is
excluded from an academic activity-or by extension, deprived of
equal enjoyment of the activity-and disability is a motivating
80. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2001) (ADA title 1), with 34 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2001)
(section 504).
81. See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local
Government: The RelationshipBetween Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct and Title I of
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct,36 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1089,1109-16 (1995) (discussing

differences between section 504 and ADA title II). In one minor difference, the ADA removed
the word "solely" from the definition of "discrimination on the basis of disability" to solve the
potential coverage problem created if someone were discriminated against on account of
disability as well as race or sex See id. at 1110-11 (collecting and discussing sources from
legislative history of ADA). The primary difference in coverage is the obvious one: Title II of
the ADA covers state and local government entities irrespective of their receipt of federal
funds, but section 504 covers all entities that receive federal funds irrespective of whether

they are government agencies.
82. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999). For discussion of Baird,see supra text accompanying
notes 31-35.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 467.
Id.
Id. at 468 & n.6.
Id. at 470.
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factor, a title H ADA action exists to recover damages for all the
losses, including humiliation, that the child suffers.87
The title H regulations include a provision specifically
prohibiting retaliation and coercion," as do the ADA's general
provisions, embodied in title V. 9 By barring conduct that interferes
with, threatens, or intimidates individuals exercising their rights
to participate in public programs, these provisions furnish an
additional basis for prohibiting harassment." Physical or verbal
abuse that children with disabilities sustain simply because they
are on public school grounds is conduct that intimidates and
interferes with people who are exercising rights to participate in a
public educational program.
(3) Hostile EnvironmentClaims Under Section 504
and Title H
In workplace harassment cases, courts have frequently decided
ADA claims based on the existence of ahostile environment. 9 There
has been no dispute that the employment provisions of the ADA,
title I, create a remedy for an employer's creation or toleration of a
87. A damages claim exists under the ADA even for conduct that is not necessarily
motivated by hostility, as long as it causes harm to a child on the basis of her disability. See
Padilla v. School Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000); infra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text (discussing Padilla).
88. 28 C.F.R. § 35.134(b) (2001) ("No private or public entity shall coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of
his or her having exercised or enjoyed... any right granted or protected by the Act or this
part."). Regulations applicable to section 504 impose a similar duty. 34 C.F.R. § 104.6 (2001)
(incorporating by reference antiretaliation provision of 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) ("No recipient or
otherperson shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the
purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by... the Act or this part .... ")).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994) ("It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her
having exercised ... any right granted or protected by this chapter.").
90. See sources cited supra notes 88-89.
91. See generallyMatusewitch, supranote 17 (discussing cases); Weber, supra note 17,
at 398-406 (discussing recent cases and characterizing topic as emerging issue). For a
discussion of the difficulty of establishing that conduct is severe and pervasive enough to
satisfy the hostile-environment standard for sex discrimination cases, see James C. Chow,
Comment, Sticks, Stones, and Simple Teasing: The Jurisprudence of Non-Cognizable
HarassingConduct in the Context of Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claims, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 133 (1999).
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work environment hostile to persons with disabilities. 92 Drawing
analogies to hostile-environment sexual harassment cases, courts
have applied a test that focuses on whether the harassment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
plaintiffs employment and to create an abusive working
environment. 3 With regard to intent, they have required that the
defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed
9
to take prompt, effective remedial action.
Two cases from 2001 exemplify these holdings. In Flowers v.
Southern Regional PhysicianServices,9 5 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmedjudgment on ajury verdict in favor of an employee
who had been diagnosed with HIV infection. After her supervisor
learned of the infection, the supervisor stopped going to lunch with
her and socializing with her, and instead eavesdropped on her.96
The employer's president refused to shake her hand and generally
avoided her. 97 She was made to undergo four drug tests in a week,
and subjected to other humiliations;9 8 eventually, the company
terminated her employment. 99 The court ruled that an ADA cause
of action exists when an employee is harassed on the basis of

92. The circuits are in agreement on this point. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n,
168 F.3d 661, 666-67 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Indeed, we have not discovered any case holding
that the claim cannot be asserted under the ADA."); see also Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of
Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1998) (assuming cause of action exists); Keever v. City

of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging existence of hostile work
environment as cause of action); McConathyv. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558,563
(5th Cir. 1998) (proceeding as though cause of action exists).
93. E.g., Fosburgv. Lehigh Univ., No. CIV.A.98-CV-864,1999WL 124458, at*6 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 4, 1999).
94. Id. An influential early case is Hqysman v. FoodLion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D.
Ga. 1995). Haysman involved a store employee with back, knee, and mental impairments.
After being provided accommodations on the job, he was the victim of a pattern of
harassment from the manager and assistant manager of the store: they browbeat him in
front of other employees, accusing him of malingering; the assistant manager used extreme
profanity with him and would strike or kick him on the weakened parts of his body; and his
shift was changed to night without good reason. Id. at 1097-98. The court found that the
allegations, if proven, would constitute a hostile environment claim. Id. at 1106.
95. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
96. Id. at 236.
97. Id. at 237.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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disability.1"0 It found the evidence sufficient to support the jury's
decision on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. 1 '
Two weeks after Flowers came down, the Fourth Circuit also
affirmed a judgment in favor of an employee in a disability
harassment case. The plaintiff in Fox. v. General Motors Corp.0 2
returned from disability leave with a light-duty work restriction. A
supervisor and foreman blocked the efforts of the employee's
immediate supervisor to accommodate him; they humiliated him
when he refused to do tasks beyond his restrictions.0 3 He was
placed at a special work table that was too low for him-and made
his back injury worse.'0 4 He was prevented from taking steps to
obtain a promotion, and he and other workers with disabilities were
continually verbally harassed.0 5 He introduced expert testimony in
support of his claim of emotional damage that included severe
depression, anxiety, and thoughts of suicide.0 6 The court ruled that
a reasonable jury could find the harassment severe and pervasive
enough to create a hostile work environment,0 7 and affirmed a
verdict of $200,000 compensatory damages for emotional injury and
other harms.'O
In the higher education context, a court has ruled that a
graduate film student asserted a claim of disability harassment
when she alleged that a professor and adjunct professor at the
school repeatedly accused her of faking dyslexia and told her that
she was mentally retarded, lazy, and stupid.'0 9 The court noted that
the validity of the claim turned on the pervasiveness and severity
100. Id. at 233.
101. Id. at 236. On the topic of remedies, the court held that the plaintiff had not
presented adequate evidence of specific emotional injury, and so vacated the damages award
and remanded for entry of an award of nominal damages. Id- at 239.
102. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 173.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 173-74.
106. Id. at 178.
107. Id. at 176.
108. Id. at 181. The court considered the hostile work environment claim to be something
other than a claim of intentional discrimination, and overturned an award of $4000 for
unpaid overtime on the ground that it was inconsistent with the jury's finding that General
Motors had not intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Id.
109. Pell v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., No. 97 Civ. 0193(SS), 1998 WL 19989, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998).
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of the conduct, and found that the allegations met this standard. 0
Two other higher education cases recognized the existence of a
hostile environment claim, although they found the claim in those
cases unsupported by the facts.'
A public school student plaintiff in a disability harassment case
should be able to make out a claim for relief under section 504 or
title II of the ADA by showing a hostile environment." Hostile
environment is not the only way to establish a claim; some of the
cases described above in connection with specific acts of disability
harassment would satisfy a standard based on analogy to hostileenvironment employment cases whereas others might not.
Nevertheless, when severity and pervasiveness of harassing
conduct is shown and the school district is aware or should be
aware of the conduct, the analogy to the employment and higher
education cases supports a, claim for actionable discrimination
based on the unequal educational environment to which the student
is subjected.
b. Analogies to Sexual Harassment
Contributing to a heightened awareness of disability harassment in the schools is the heightened awareness of other forms of
harassment."' Sexual harassment in the public schools furnished
the subject for two Supreme Court cases in 1998 and 1999.14 Both
110. Id. at *18 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
111. Rothman v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1997) (evaluating evidence and
finding lack of showing of hostile environment); Guckenbergerv. Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp.
306, 314 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that new disability accommodations policy and speeches
of university president did not constitute hostile environment).
112. See Adam A. Milani, HarassingSpeech in the PublicSchools: The Validity OfSchools'
Regulation of FightingWords and the Consequences If They Do Not, 28 AKRON L. REv. 187,
232 (1995) (discussing claim for hostile environment under section 504).
113. Racial harassment is also actionable. See, e.g., Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693
(8th Cir. 1999) (upholding claims for racial and sexual harassment in employment case);
Allen v. Michigan Dep't of Corrs., 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding claim for hostile
environment based on racially derogatory language of supervisors in employment case);
Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding claim for
racially hostile environment in employment case).
114. Significant recent development has also occurred with regard to workplace
harassment based on sex. E.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
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cases were decided under title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, a statute whose wording exactly parallels that of section
1 held that
504.115 Gebser v. Lago Vista IndependentSchool District"
a school district is liable in damages for known acts of sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher if the district is deliberately
indifferent to the activity. 17 The next year, Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education"' held that a school district is liable if it is
deliberately indifferent to known acts of peer harassment." 9 The
conduct must be sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it denies the victim student equal access to education.
Deliberate indifference occurs whenever the school's actions or
inactions in response to the harassment are clearly unreasonable
in light of known circumstances.'
Applied to disability harassment in the public schools, the
lesson of Gebser and Davis is that districts face liability under
section 504, and thus under title II of the ADA, for activity both by
employees and by student-peers, ifthe conduct is sufficiently severe
and the district meets an intent standard, for instance, deliberate
indifference to known conduct. A single incident will support a
hostile environment-sex harassment claim under title IX, if the
incident is severe enough,"l and a similar rule should apply by
analogy in disability harassment cases.

Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
115. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (title IX), with 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994 & Supp. V
1999) (section 504). The similarity of section 504 and title II of the ADAin turn suggests that
conduct analogous to that which violates title IX will also violate title II of the ADA in an
appropriate case. See supratext accompanying notes 80-81 (describing parallel obligations
under section 504 and title II of ADA).
116. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).

117. Id. at 277.
118. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).

119. Id. at 633.
120. Id. at 648.
121. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2000)
("[O]ne incident can satisfy a claim...."); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19,66 F. Supp. 2d
57,62 (D. Me. 1999) ("Within the context of Title IX, a students claim of hostile environment
can arise from a single incident.").
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2. Remedies
Damages are the proper remedy for intentional conduct that
violates section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or title II of the ADA.
Most authorities, however, have rejected the idea of section 504 or
title II damages liability against individuals'22 except for coercion
or retaliation claims," and courts have not yet begun to view
122. The theory is that the general provisions of section 504 only apply to entities that are
federal grantees, and that the comparable provisions of title II only apply to state and local
governmental agencies. Thus, courts hold there is ordinarily no liability for persons, just
entities. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(ADA), cert. dismissed sub nom. Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000); Smith v. Maine
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, No. 00-284-P.C, 2001 WL 68305, at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 29,2001) (both
Rehabilitation Act and ADA); Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692-93 (D. Haw.
2000) (ADA); Hallett v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 109 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (both); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543,557
(D.N.J. 2000) (both); Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 76 F. Supp. 2d 572, 574-75 (M.D. Pa. 1999)
(ADA); Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241 (D. Colo. 1999) (both). But see Niece v.
Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (E.D. Mich. 1996) ("There is nothing within Title II which
explicitly authorizes or prohibits suits against public actors acting in their official or
individual capacities."); Johnson v. New York Hosp., 897 F. Supp. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(upholding individual liability of hospital president under section 504), affd, 96 F.3d 33 (2d
Cir. 1996); Chaplinv. Consolidated Edison Co., 587 F. Supp. 519,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (section
504). For an argument that individual liability ought to exist for all intentional ADA title II,
Rehabilitation Act section 504, and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act violations,
and that qualified immunity should not protect defendants subject to the liability, see Gary
S. Gildin, Dis-qualifiedImmunity for DiscriminationAgainst the Disabled, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 897.
123. The retaliation provision is different from the rest of the statute in that it clearly
applies to all persons, not just to covered entities or federal grantees. 42 U.S.C. § 12203
(1994) (stating that no person "shall discriminate against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter," and that it "shall
be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise
or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised ... any right granted or
protected by this chapter"). The retaliation-coercion prevision is found in ADA title V, apart
from the titles that apply to specific covered entities (title I for employers offifteen or more
employees, employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management
committees; title II for state and local governmental entities; title III for public
accommodations; and title IV for telecommunications carriers). One case that disagrees with
this interpretation of the retaliation provision, however, is Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,47172 (4th Cir. 1999) (disallowing individual liability on basis of analogy to title VII of Civil
Rights Act). See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. The parallel provision for section 504
similarly forbids coercion and retaliation by anyone, not only grantees. 34 C.F.R. § 104.61
(2001) (incorporating by reference antiretaliation provision of 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) ("No
recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any
individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by... the Act or
this part....")). A plaintiff need not be an individual with disabilities to assert a claim based
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harassment as a form of coercion or retaliation. Hence, the bulk of
the damages case law bears on the liability of school districts for
harassment of students with disabilities by school officials or the
students' peers. Although damages are available against school
districts or other public educational agencies for the harassment,
the challenge lies in proving intent on the part of the public agency
as a predicate for damages relief. Once that challenge is met,
damages are an appropriate form of relief on the basis of considerations of policy as well as statutory interpretation.
a. DemonstratingIntent
Rehabilitation Act section 504 and ADA title II follow the same
wording as title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964124 and title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972125 in prohibiting discrimination
and providing remedies to its victims. As early as 1980, in
GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Service Commission,126 the Supreme Court
approved the entry of injunctive relief for unintentional violations
of title VI. Nevertheless, when confronting actions for damages
liability under title VI and its parallel statutes, the courts generally
required a showing of intent, just as the Supreme Court had
on the ADA retaliation provision. Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1999)
(absence of finding that plaintiff was disabled did not preclude finding that employer
retaliated against him).
124. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
125. Codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
126. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
127. Id. at 584; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 (1985) (explaining
application of GuardiansAss'nto disparate impact claim undersection504). Choateheld that
section 504 reaches some, but not all, disparate impacts against people with disabilities. See
id. at 299. GurardiansAss'nappears to have been limited inAlexanderv. Sandoval,532 U.S.
275 (2001), which ruled that title VI itself reaches only intentional discrimination, and that
no private right of action exists to enforce the title VI regulations that proscribe activities
that have only a disparate impact. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285-86. The Court, however,
pointed out in Sandovalthat section 504, unlike title VI, actually does cover some disparate
impacts. Id. at 285 (citing Choate,469 U.S. at 299, 309). Four justices dissented in Sandoval,
arguing that the Court incorrectly overturned the private remedy to enforce the title VI
regulations barring disparate-impact discrimination. Id. at 293. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Whether the Court's restriction of the reach of Guardian's Ass'n is consistent with
congressional intent is not of relevance to the interpretation of section 504 put forward in
this Article. The discussion here relates to intentional conduct and damages remedies, not
disparate-impact conduct and injunctive remedies.
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required a showing of intent for damages liability under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.'2 8 In ConsolidatedRail Corp.
v. Darrone,"9 the Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Act
permits monetary claims,3 0 but courts elaborating on that rule
have insisted on a showing of intentional discrimination before
compensatory damages may be awarded.'
As with municipal liability for equal protection and other
constitutional violations, the liability of a corporate entity for an
intentional violation of section 504 or the ADA requires a
determination of the intent of a constructive being that has no
single "mind." In Monell v. Department of Social Services," 2 the
Supreme Court stressed that liability under section 1983 l13 for
violations of the Constitution would not attach on the basis of
respondeat superior alone. 3 4 Instead, the conduct of the municipality had to be pursuant to policy or custom, though the Court
later ruled that a single decision of an authoritative officer could
satisfy the test, 3 as could inadequate training or supervision,
if the
36
conduct met a standard of "deliberate indifference."
128. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
129. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
130. Id. (permitting action for back pay pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act); see also
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (permitting damages
action pursuant to title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 for intentional conduct).
131. E.g., Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1984) (requiring showing of intent to
support monetary claim); David H. v. Palmyra Area Sch. Dist., 769 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Pa.
1990) (denying section 504 claim for monetary relief in absence of showing of intent), affd,
932 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1991) (table). This approach has been challenged. Sande Buhai & Nina
Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: DiscriminatoryIntent As a Prerequisiteto Damages Under
theADA, 52 RUTGERSL. REV. 1121 (2000) (relying on underlying purposes ofADAto conclude
that damages should be available for violations without showing of intentional
discrimination); Leonard J. Augustine, Jr., Note, Disabling the Relationship Between
IntentionalDiscriminationand CompensatoryDamagesUnder Title I of theAmericanswith
DisabilitiesAct, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 592,607-12 (1998) (criticizing intent requirement for
damages in title II accommodations actions).
132. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
134. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 & n.58.
135. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (permitting liability based on
county prosecutor's approval of police breaking down doctor's door to serve subpoenas).
136. City ofCanton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,388 & n.8 (1989). The "deliberate indifference"
standard originated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
ruled that failure to provide medical attention to a prisoner is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if there is "deliberate indifference to
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In the context of section 504 and ADA title II liability for
damages on the part of a school district, the dominant test for
intent, and thus for damages liability, is the requirement of bad
faith or gross misjudgment," 7 though there is no reason to believe
that the test is an exclusive one.' What constitutes bad faith or
gross misjudgment differs greatly from court to court. For example,
in Sellers v. School Board,'39 the court affirmed the dismissal of a
claim for damages, reasoning that the long-term failure to identify
a child's learning disabilities and the consequent failure to provide
special education services that the child needed did not amount to
bad faith or gross misjudgment. By contrast, in McKellar v.
Commonwealth of PennsylvaniaDepartment of Education,4 ° the
court found that the bad faith or gross misjudgment standard could
be met when the district failed to provide an appropriate education
over a period of time and repeatedly ignored a child's written
education programs."
In the context of sexual harassment in the public schools, the
Supreme Court has applied the deliberate indifference standard
without reference to anybad faith-gross misjudgment test. InDavis
v. Monroe County Board of Education,'42 the decision permitting
damages liability against a school district for sexual harassment by
a student's peers, the Court applied a standard for liability
requiring that the responsible school official or officials be
deliberately indifferent to known behavior serious enough to have
serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The Supreme Court has also
applied the standard to generalized complaints that prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,303 (1991).
137. E.g., Walker v. District of Columbia, 969 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1997) (permitting
liability). Cases such as Walker contrast with a somewhat greater number of cases applying
the test and denying liability. E.g., Thompson v. Board of the Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144
F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding test not met in dispute over services); KU. v. Alvin Indep.
Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same), affd, 166 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1998)
(table).
138. See T.J.W. v. Dothan City Bd. ofEduc., 26 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep.
(LRP) 999 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 12, 1997) (permitting a damages claim under standard of
intentional discrimination or bad-faith conduct).
139. 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998).
140. No. 98-CV-4161, 1999 WL 124381 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1999).
141. Id. at *5. The court denied the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment, reasoning
that a jury could "reasonably infer that the defendants were acting in bad faith." Id.
142. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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a systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an
educational program or activity. 143 The Court declared that the
standard is met and a suit for damages is appropriate when school
officials know that a child in the victim's school is engaging in
sexually assaultive behavior but fail to do anything to stop it, and
the child then sexually assaults the victim.'" Davis involved
liability under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, but
because of the nearly identical wording of title IX and section 504,
the decision suggests that assaults motivated by a child's disability
will produce liability under section 504 or the ADA if the deliberate
indifference standard is met, just as title IX imposes liability if the
standard is met regarding assaults related to a child's sex. The
Court had previously applied a similar standard to teacher sexual
harassment of students. 145
All the various tests that courts have used in the section 504
cases and analogous situations are simply efforts to construct the
intentions of an artificial, corporate body.14 1 In the context of
disability harassment, damages should be available under section
504 and title II against a school district upon a direct-evidence or
inferential showing of intent on the part of that entity. Plaintiffs
should be able to demonstrate intent by policy or custom, by a
decision of an authoritative official to do or fail to do something, by
inadequate training that amounts to deliberate indifference, by an
official's deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment, by
bad faith conduct of officials, or by the officials' gross misjudgment.

143. Id. at 633.
144. Id. at 648.
145. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
146. For example, the deliberate indifference standard is simply a proxy for the policy or
custom that is a form of corporate intent: "Only where a municipality's failure to train its

employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom ...
Collins v. City ofHarkerHeights, 503 U.S. 115,123 n.6 (1992) (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
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b. Additional Policy ConsiderationsRegardingDamages
Relief
Apart from questions about what statutes and precedents
require as a predicate for damages relief, the question remains
whether damages are a sensible remedy for disability harassment.
They are.
Disability harassment's nearest analogy among common law
causes of action is the intentional infliction of emotional distress.14
Indeed, many cases of disability harassment that proceed on federal
statutory causes of action include pendent state law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.148 Courts imposing
damages remedies in intentional infliction cases have recognized
that monetary compensation is the only viable way to respond to
the indignity and humiliation imposed on the victim of outrageous
treatment. Moreover, it is the only sensible way, short of criminal
sanctions, to deter potential defendants from engaging in behavior
that oversteps the bounds of civil society.
For these reasons, Judge Easterbrook's discussion in CharlieF.
v. Board of Education"9 of supposedly preferable alternatives to
damages relief borders on the fatuous. Judge Easterbrook rejected
the contention that "available relief" for a pattern of teachersanctioned peer harassment meant damages, reasoning that
compensatory services could be an adequate remedy, even though
the child had moved from the school district. 50 On the basis of this
reasoning, his opinion for the court required dismissal of the case
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which could provide
compensatory services but not damages.' 5 ' Although it is true that
147. See infra text accompanying notes 207-30 (discussing intentional infliction cause of
action for disability harassment).
148. E.g., Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,472-73 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss
liability claim against teacher for intentional infliction of emotional distress when teacher
humiliated student in front of class). The intentional infliction cause of action for disability
harassment is discussed at greater length infra text accompanying notes 207-30. Baird's
facts are discussed supratext accompanying notes 31-35.
149. 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996).
150. Id. at 991-93.
151. Id. at 993. The relevant statute requires administrative exhaustion when a civil
action seeks "relief that is also available under" the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, whose remedies are generally considered to be limited to prospective relief, tuition
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money may pay for compensatory psychological or other services
that could be provided in an educational program, money damages
for emotional distress represent far more than that.'5 2
Compensatory services are, in a word, undercompensatory. They
do nothing to pay for the humiliation that the child has suffered,
and do little to deter school districts from engaging in similar
conduct. 153 Moreover, in the all-too-frequent situation in which a
family, seeing no way out, moves away from the district, there is no
longer any connection with the school that is supposed to provide
the compensatory services. If the child remains in the district,
compensatory education prolongs a relationship between the child
and the school without necessarily changing the character of the
relationship. As a remedy, it is reminiscent of Albert Alschuler's
account of the first time Bernard Goetz was robbed: the mugger,
savvy to the system, tried to use a mediation process to derail the
criminal justice proceedings.' Compensatory education may be a
good remedy in situations in which solutions can be mediated
between a school district acting in good faith and a child whose
parents want to maintain a long-term relationship with that
school.' 5 5 It is no remedy for a child who has been "mugged"
reimbursement, and compensatory education. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2000); see also infra text
accompanying notes 171-201 (discussing remedies under special education law); 283-317
(discussing administrative exhaustion defense to harassment claims).
152. Strangely, the opinion nearly concedes this point. A passage at the end reads:
"Perhaps Charlie's adverse reaction to the events of fourth grade cannot be overcome by
services available under the IDEA [Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] and the
regulations, so that in the end money is the only balm." Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993. The
paragraph concludes: "[Alt least in principle relief is available under the IDEA." Id. The
purely formal analysis, relying on relief that is available in principle, underscores the point
that courts do not accept disability harassment, even of the most outrageous character, as
a form of discrimination that works harm in fact, not in principle.
153. See Kara W. Edmunds, Note, Implying Damages Under the Individuals with
DisabilitiesEducationAct: Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools Adds New Fuel to
the Argument, 27 GA. L. REV. 789, 839-40 (1993) (questioning sufficiency of compensatory
education as a remedy in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act cases in general).
154. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808,
1808 (1986). In a much reported incident that occurred in the New York City subway in 1984,
Goetz shot several youths when he believed they were about to rob him. Id. at 1809-10.
155. These situations could include those in which needed services were delayed on
account of administrative snafus or bona fide disputes over appropriateness. E.g., M.C. v.
Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389,395-97 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing suitability of cases for
awards of compensatory education). In some circumstances, however, damages reliefmay be
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-physically or mentally assaulted-by the school district, its
employees, or students.
Tuition reimbursement is similarly inadequate as a remedy.
Few parents will have incurred tuition bills as a direct result of
harassment. Typically, they incur tuition costs because the
particular mix of services the child needs is not available in the
educational program the school district offers.15 6 The parents thus
have to contract for education outside the school system and enroll
the child elsewhere.15 7 It is conceivable that in some cases parents
remove their child from public school and pay tuition at a private
school to get the child away from abuse by peers or teachers. In that
case, however, tuition reimbursement is just as undercompensatory
as compensatory education. It makes up for the out-of-pocket costs
caused by the defendants' conduct but does nothing to remedy the
humiliation and loss of self-esteem the child suffers.
The deterrent effects of damages awards should not be
overlooked either."5 Although school district administrators may
not pay awards out of their own pockets, the school superintendent
will certainly be in an awkward position trying to explain a large
damages award to the school board that renews his contract and
sets his salary. If disability harassment is ever to be stopped, the
threat of damages will be an important reason for the change. 159
Moreover, as discussed more fully below with respect to common
law liability, damages awards have an important symbolic role in
proper forbureaucratic bungling. E.g., W.B.v. Matula, 67 F.3d484 (3d Cir. 1995) (permitting
damages claim to proceed in case involving delays in providing special education services).
156. E.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-74 (1985)
(permitting award of tuition reimbursement in case brought under predecessor statute to
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
157. E.g., Florence County Sch. Dist. 4v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7,9-10 (1993) (permitting award
oftuition reimbursement for school unilaterally chosen by parents and not on state's list of
approved schools).
158. See generally EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES 824 (5th ed. 2000) ("[B]y
imposing upon tortfeasors the cost of their wrongful acts, [damages] promote the deterrent
value oftort law."). In the last generation, the deterrent effects ofdamages awards have been
the special subject of the law and economics movement. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972) (discussing self-interest in taking
precautions against harm to avoid damages award).
159. See Mark C. Weber, Comment on Casper,Seasons of Change, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Implementationin the Work Place, 17 J. REHABILITATIONADMIN. 135 (1993)
(describing deterrent effects ofADA regarding discriminatory employment practices).
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expressing social disapproval. 6 ° Social disapproval of disability
harassment is crucial to taking harassment seriously and stopping
it.
B. The Individuals with DisabilitiesEducationAct (IDEA)
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act guarantees
children with disabilities a free, appropriate public education.
Accordingly, the claims and remedies under the statute merit
discussion in the context of legal claims for disability harassment.
1. Claims
Education in a setting rife with harassment is hardly conducive
to learning and is antithetical to "appropriate education" for
children with disabilities. Nevertheless, when the drafters of what
was to become IDEA conceived of how it would operate, they
predominantly had in mind situations in which children with
disabilities were getting inadequate or improper services. 161 This
preoccupation led the Supreme Court to comment that through the
Act "Congress sought primarily to make public education available
to handicapped children," 62 and that Congress relied on the
observance of statutory procedures by schools and parents to
achieve the correct type and level of services for eligible children. 6 '
The type of dispute that would be resolved by following procedures
for meetings, written plans, and administrative hearings would be
like those found in the Supreme Court's special education docket
early in the history of the statute: a dispute over whether a signlanguage interpreter had to be provided to a deaf child with
160. See infra text accompanying notes 225-28 (discussing symbolic effects of damages
awards and collecting authorities).
161. For example, the legislative history is preoccupied with the concern that large
numbers of children were out of school or not getting specialized services while in school. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975) (reporting that 1,750,000 students with disabilities
receive no public schooling and 2,200,000 lack adequate services).
162. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
163. See id. at 205 ("When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards
embodied in [20 U.S.C.] § 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise
substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress
attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid.").
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excellent lip-reading abilities, 64 or a demand that a school district
provide catheterization at school for a child who could not urinate
normally.16 5 Problems such as harassment of children with
disabilities subvert the appropriate education guaranteed by the
Act, but the Act's focus is on getting the appropriate services in the
first place, not on the proper remedies to impose when peers or
in discrimination and effectively undermine the
teachers engage
166
program.
Moreover, only children who meet the definition ofchildren with
disabilities under IDEA are able to obtain the protections of that
law. Many children have physical or mental impairments, but the
impairments do not force them to receive special education in order
to learn, and so they are not covered under the terms of the Act. 6 '
For example, a child who needs a wheelchair for mobility would
meet the ADA's definition of a person with disabilities,'16 but if she
164. Id. at 184-85.
165. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984) (affirming order for
services).
166. Indicative of the congressional focus on getting the services to the children rather
than providing against intentional interference with use of the services is the failure to enact
an antiretaliation provision, even though Congress was familiar with such provisions, as
shown by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights laws. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973i
(1994) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1994) (title II of Civil Rights Act of
1964).
167. BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS wrrH

DIsABILrTIES 8:2-3 (1991 & Supp. 2000) ("The IDEA only protects children who, by virtue of
their disabilities, require special education services. Section 504, however, prohibits
discrimination against all school-age children with disabilities, regardless of whether they
require special education services.") (footnotes omitted); PEERW.D.WRIGHT&PAMELADARR
WRIGHT, WRIGHTSLAW: SPECIALEDUCATIONLAw 261 (1999) ("Ifthe childhas a disability that
adversely affects educational performance, the child is covered under IDEA. Ifthe child has
a disability that does not adversely affect educational performance, the child is usually
covered under Section 504 but does not receive services under IDEA.").
168. The Supreme Court recently narrowed the definition of individuals covered by the
Americans with Disabilities Act by ruling that people whose major life activities are not
substantially limited when their impairments are corrected by mitigating measures do not
qualify unless they are regarded as disabled or have a record of disability. See Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564-65 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516, 521-25 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-89 (1999). The
Court further restricted the definition of being regarded as having a disability. Sutton, 527
U.S. at 489; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 525. In none ofthe cases, however, did the Court doubt that
a person who needs a wheelchair for mobility meets the ADA's definition. Much recent
commentary criticizes the Court's rulings in the Sutton trilogy. E.g., Bonnie Poitras Tucker,
The Supreme Court'sDefinitionofDisability Under the ADA- A Return to the DarkAges, 52
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does not need special education,'6 9 she is outside the coverage of
IDEA. Similarly, children with mental conditions that limit major
life activities unrelated to learning or with borderline effects on
learning may not qualify for the Act's protection.7 These children
may be entitled to services or to program modifications pursuant to
section 504 or the ADA, but they would not be able to make a claim
under IDEA for harassment by teachers or peers or for any other
conduct.
The emphasis in the Act on educational and related services and
the gaps in the coverage of the of the Act make it a less than ideal
avenue for relief in harassment cases. This is not to say that a
school district's maintenance of an environment in which
harassment occurs does not violate IDEA. If the environment
renders the education inappropriate for an eligible child's needs, the
district has violated IDEA, and so, typically, harassment will
violate the Act. As a discussion of the scope of remedies under the
Act demonstrates, however, IDEA is often deficient as a remedial
mechanism for harassment.
2. Remedies
The remedies under IDEA for teacher or peer harassment are
far from clear. The consensus of decisions at present appears to be
ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000); Mark C. Weber, DisabilityDiscriminationin HigherEducation,26
J.C. & U.L. 351, 354-55 (1999). Nevertheless, the coverage of the ADA and section 504
remains broader than that of IDEA. See generally Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79,266
F.3d 916, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of claim ofharassment by teachers on
ground that child did not meet definition of individual with disabilities).
169. Most children using wheelchairs would be designated as eligible under IDEA if for
no other reason than their need for adaptive physical education. Nevertheless, in many
jurisdictions high school children do not need to take physical education all four years, so the
eligibility would not necessarily be present. A child with a visual impairment who needs only
to have large-print materials or other similar adaptations would not necessarily require
special education of any type.
170. A child with Tourette's syndrome may require exceptions to ordinary discipline
policies but not need any special education services. Similarly, a child with attention deficit
disorder may need supplemental services but not meet the standards for eligibility under
IDEA. See, e.g., Brittan Elementary Sch. Dist., 16 Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. 1226 (U.S.
Dep't ofEduc., Off. for Civil Rights 1990) (discussing coverage under section 504 for child not
eligible for services under federal special education law). See generally Costello, 266 F.3d at
922-23 (ruling that claim failed under IDEA in case of verbal and physical abuse when child
was not eligible for special education services).
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that the statute itself does not permit administrative hearing
officers to award damages,'171 and several circuit courts have
generalized the point to forbid damages claims in most court actions
under IDEA."72 Both hearing officers and judges may grant tuition
reimbursement and compensatory education services, 173 but for the
reasons mentioned in the previous section, tuition reimbursement
and compensatory education are no more than second-best remedies
for the pain and humiliation that harassment inflicts.
Numerous courts, however, have permitted damages liability to
be imposed pursuant to section 19837" for at least some classes of
171. See, e.g., Padilla v. School Dist. No. 1,233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[E]ven
if damages are available under the IDEA they should be awarded in civil actions, not in
administrative hearings."); Covington v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912,918 (6th Cir.
2000) ("[Mloney damages ... are unavailable through the administrative process .... "); see
also cases citedinfra note 172 (finding damages unavailable even in court proceedings under
20 U.S.C. § 1415); Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple asABC: DiscipliningChildrenwith
DisabilitiesUnder the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 AIz. L. REV. 77, 85 n.32 (2000) ("Most
courts passing on the question have decided that the IDEA was not intended to confer a right
to money damages for violations.").
172. E.g., Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1999)
("[O]rdinarily, monetary damages are not available under that statute."); Sellers v. School
Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 526-27 (4th Cir. 1998) (disallowing damages under IDEA in case
characterized as sounding in educational malpractice); Hoekstra v. Independent Sch. Dist.
No. 283, 103 F.3d 624, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding compensatory damages unavailable
under IDEA); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382,386-87 (6th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting damages claim under IDEA); cf Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020
n.24 (1984) (noting apparent consensus among courts at time that predecessor statute to
IDEA did not allow damages relief). The point applies to typical actions arising under IDEA
through its ordinary enforcement mechanism, 20 U.S.C. § 1415; whether the courts in those
circuits would permit damages under exceptional circumstances remains unclear. See
TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 167 at 18:4-5 (discussing availability of damages in
exceptional circumstances). The failure to award compensatory damages in IDEA cases has
been criticized. Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individualswith DisabilitiesEducationAct:
Determining'AppropriateRelief"in a Post-Gwinnett Era, 85 VA. L. REV. 853, 882-86 (1999)
(arguing that denial of damages relief contravenes congressional intent).
173. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); see also 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000) (1997 IDEA amendment permitting courts and hearing
officers to award tuition reimbursement).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The application of a section 1983 cause of
action to violations of the federal special education laws originated with the situation in
which the plaintiff, because offutility, an emergency, or some other reason, was excused from
exhausting the administrative procedures provided in the special education law and filed suit
directly with the court. The leading case of this type arose from the defendant's failure to
obey the results of a due process hearing. Robinsonv. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.
1987). The court ruled that the plaintiff did not need to re-exhaust the claim, but it found
that the proper cause of action under the circumstances was not the one contemplating full
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IDEA violations. 175 In W.B. v. Matula,7 6 for example, the Third

Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs could assert a claim for a violation
of IDEA under section 1983 when a school district took most of a
child's first grade year to find that he was eligible for services under
section 504 due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, used
most of his second-grade year to determine that he was
neurologically impaired and eligible for services under IDEA, and
then spent all of the following year resisting an independent
evaluation-which ultimately found that the child had Tourette's
syndrome and a severe obsessive-compulsive disorder in addition to
hyperactivity. 7 A hearing officer finally resolved the dispute over
the services, ordering the child placed in a private school with
additional therapy sessions, but the decision
did not occur until the
178
beginning of the following school year.
The court noted that section 1983 exists to provide a means of
79
redress for violations of federal law by governmental agents.1
Section 1983 will not furnish a remedy if Congress intended to
foreclose its use by adopting a comprehensive statutory enforcement
plan inconsistent with section 1983."'0 But with regard to the
statute that is now IDEA, Congress overruled a Supreme Court
decision, Smith v. Robinson, 8 ' which had found section 1983 to be
foreclosed. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
(HCPA) was intended to overrule Smith, and to restore the
availability of section 1983 in special education cases. 82 As the W.B.
use of the administrative process, that under 20 U.S.C. § 1415, but rather the cause of action
for governmental violations of federal law in general, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of what
is now IDEA. Robinson, 810 F.2d at 1273; see also Manecke v. School Bd., 762 F.2d 912 (11th
Cir. 1985) (applying section 1983 cause of action to case in which district failed to act on
parents' request for administrative hearing).
175. See infra note 198 (collecting cases) and accompanying text.
176. 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
177. Id. at 488-90. Although the case does not directly involve disability harassment, the
court noted that in first grade the child suffered teasing because of his incontinence, a peer
response that the school apparently felt no need to deal with. Id. at 488.
178. Id. at 490.
179. Id. at 493.
180. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1(1981)
(finding section 1983 remedy implicitly preempted by comprehensive enforcement
mechanisms in water pollution control statutes).
181. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
182. See W.B., 67 F.3d at 493-94 n.6 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict
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court stated: "In enacting [the HCPA], Congress specifically
intended that [IDEA] violations could be redressed by § 504 and §
1983 actions .... "181 Section 1983 actions carry the full range of
available civil remedies, including compensatory damages.8 4 The
W.B. court found no obstacle to the award of damages pursuant to
section 1983 for IDEA violations, 8 ' though it cautioned that other
86
remedies may be more suitable under the facts of a given case.
In the recent case Padillav. School DistrictNo. 1,187 the Tenth
Circuit took a view contrary to that of the Third Circuit. Padilla
involved a child with severe disabilities who sued her previous
school district, alleging that the district ignored the written
program it had created for her services and failed to provide her
with behavioral programming, augmentative communication, and
tube-feeding services. District personnel also repeatedly placed her
in a windowless closet, restrained her in a stroller, and left her
without supervision. During one of those incidents, she tipped over
and suffered a skull fracture, which exacerbated her seizure
disorder. Her injuries kept her from school the rest of the semester,
but the district did not provide her with the homebound services to
which she was entitled. 88
Although the court permitted a claim for damages to proceed
under the Americans with Disabilities Act,' 89 it required the
dismissal of a section 1983 claim premised on violations of IDEA. 9 0
or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of children and
youth with disabilities .... ") (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)); H. CONF. REP. No. 99-296, at 4
(1985) ("[S]ince 1987, it has been Congress' intent to permit parents or guardians to pursue
the rights of handicapped children through [IDEAl, section 504, and section 1983 ....
Congressional intent was ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court when it handed down its
decision in Smith v. Robinson.").

183. W.B., 67 F.3d at 494.
184. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).

185. W.B., 67 F.3d at 495.
186. Id.
187. 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 1271.
189. Id. at 1274-75. The court held that exhaustion was not required, ruling that IDEA
administrative remedies could not provide relief for physical injuries such as a skull fracture,
and that damages are generally unavailable in IDEA administrative hearings. Id. For this
point, the court relied on W.B., 67 F.3d at 494-96, as well as Covington v. Knox County School
System, 205 F.3d 912,918 (6th Cir. 2000).
190. Padilla,233 F.3d at 1275.
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It held that although Congress overruled Smith v. Robinson in the
HCPA, the overruling was intended to restore only the ability to
make section 1983 claims for constitutional violations, not the
ability to make section 1983 claims for violations of what is now
IDEA. According to the Tenth Circuit, the HCPA left intact the
implication in Smith that IDEA supplants section 1983 actions for
violations of the statute itself. For support, the court cited two
occasions on which the Supreme Court cited Smith after the HCPA
in discussing the availability of section 1983 in contexts other than
the special education laws. 19'
The HCPA's legislative history makes clear that Congress
intended to maintain means of enforcing IDEA other than the
section 1415 process.' 92 The HCPA established that, contrary to
what the Supreme Court held in Smith,193 section 1415 is not an
191. Id. at 1274.
192. See 131 CONG. REC. 21,391 (1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("I do not believe that
Congress when it passed... the Education for All Handicapped Children Act [predecessor
to IDEA] intended to in any way limit handicapped children's educational rights or the
remedies for protecting those rights."); 131 CONG. REC. 21,389 (1985) (statement of Sen.

Weicker) ("The court's decision ... raised questions about the extent to which rights,
remedies and procedures available under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and other
Federal civil rights statutes will be applicable to claims made under the Education of the
Handicapped Act [predecessor to IDEA]. The purpose of S. 415 is simple-to overturn the
Smith v. Robinson decision and thereby to clarify congressional intent regarding these
matters."); 131 CONG.REC. 31,370 (1985) (statement of Rep. Williams) ("The original billwas
designed to ... reestablish statutory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
decision Smith v. Robinson [and] to reaffirm, in light of this decision, the viability of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the other statutes as separate
vehicles for ensuring the rights of handicapped children."); see also S. REP. NO. 99-112, at 3
(1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1800 ("Section 4 provides that the [predecessor
to IDEAl does not limit the applicability of other laws which protect handicapped children
and youth...."). See generally Thomas F. Guernsey, The Education for All Handicapped
ChildrenAct, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973: Statutory
InteractionFollowing the HandicappedChildren'sProtectionAct of 1986, 68 NEB. L. REV.
564, 591-92 (1989) (describing purposes and operation of HCPA).
193. The statements ofthe HCPA's sponsors are utterly inconsistent with any speculation
that Congress intended only a partial overruling of Smith. See 132 CONG. REC. 16,824 (1986)
(statement of Sen. Kerry) ("In passing the pending conference report, Congress is specifically
rejecting the reasoning ofthe Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson."); 132 CONG. REC. 16,823
(1986) (statement of Sen. Weicker) ("The handicapped children ofthis country have paid the
costs for 2 years now. But today we correct this error. In adopting this legislation, we are
rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Smith versus Robinson, and reaffirming the
original intent of Congress...."); 131 CONG. REC. 31,375 (1985) (statement Rep. Jeffords)
("There is no doubt that there is agreement among all of us that the decision rendered by the
court in July 1984 must be overturned."); supra note 192; see also HandicappedChildren's
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exclusive remedy. 194 Once the assumption that section 1415 is
exclusive is done awaywith, ordinary principles regarding the scope
of section 1983 dictate that it is available to remedy violations of
IDEA. 195 The fact that the Supreme Court cited Smith in other
contexts does not indicate any conscious effort by the Court to
maintain an implied holding about the preemptive effect of IDEA
in the teeth of congressional action to the contrary. Given that the
Supreme Court has decided only nine cases under the special
education statute in the quarter century the law has been in
existence,' 96 it is imputing to the Court a phenomenal degree of
knowledge of the intricacies of the statute to conclude that the
Court meant to recognize the preservation of an implied holding
about IDEA by twice referring to Smith. At the most, the citations
indicate only the continued use of the same methods that Smith
used in determining when section 1983 has been preempted when
ProtectionAct:HearingsonH.R. 1523 Before the Subcomm. on Select Education ofthe House
Comm. on EducationandLabor, 99th Cong. 7 (1986) (statement of Rep. Williams) (declaring
rejection of Smith).
194. See sources cited supranote 192. This point is further illustrated by a comment from
Senator Simon:
The Supreme Court reasoned that when Congress adopted the comprehensive
enforcement mechanism for the protection of handicapped children's rights in
Public Law 94-142 [now IDEA], we superseded and eliminated rights previously
enacted under other laws. This reasoning was particularly faulty, and in
passing S. 415, Congress is rejecting that reasoning. As legislative approaches
to protecting the rights of handicapped persons grow, and we adopt new laws,
we are building upon the existing laws, with the full knowledge of those laws
and with the assumption that their provisions remain in effect as the context
for new legislation. When there is an intent to modify, limit, or supersede
existing law, Congress does not hesitate to do so explicitly.
132 CONG. REC. 16,825 (1986).
195. See, e.g., Wrightv. City ofRoanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987)
(ruling that defendant must demonstrate "by express provision or other specific evidence
from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose" the section 1983 remedy); Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) ([Tlhe § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of
federal statutory as well as constitutional law."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL

JURISDICTION § 8.8, at 529 (3d ed. 1999) ("Wright... makes clear that the presumption is in
favor of the availability of § 1983 to enforce a federal statute.").
196. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999); Florence County Sch.
Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993);
Delmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Burlington Sch.
Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468
U.S. 883 (1984); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982). None of the later cases revisited the issues decided in Smith.
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Congress has said nothing explicit about preemption one way or the
other. 197 The majority of the courts of appeals that have ruled on the
question have found that section 1983 provides a private action for
IDEA violations, at least in some circumstances. 19
Harassment is a violation of IDEA for which the section 1983
remedial avenue seems the most logical. If section 1983 is a vehicle
for remedying statutory torts, harassing conduct that violates the
federal special education statute falls within the center of that
purpose. Unlike some statutes whose private enforcement would be
inconsistent with federal policies,' 99 IDEA's basic purpose was to
give parents a means by which they personally could enforce federal
special education law.2" 0 Moreover, as noted above with regard to
the ADA and section 504 claims, damages are the most sensible
remedy for harassment. Accordingly, a remedial vehicle that
197. That was the situation in both Blessing and Wright. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329, 341 (1997); Wright, 479 U.S. at 423. If one does think that the references to Smith were
more than adventitious, one might as well conclude that they were an "I told you so" by a
Court that believed it was right in Smith and that a vindictive Congress actually changed
the law in the HCPA. There also remains the possibility that the Supreme Court justice or
clerk who provided the citations in Blessing and Wright may not have realized Smith was
overruled, much less how thorough the overruling happened to be. On Westlaw, for example,
the case is described merely as "superseded by statute/rule."
198. Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610,621-22 (7th Cir. 1997); N.B. v. Alachua County Sch.
Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996); Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d
1188, 1193 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (dictum); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 753-55 (2d Cir.
1987). But see Padilla v. School Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). Compare
Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir. 1987) (permitting section 1983
action to redress school district's failure to obey administrative decision), with Sellers v.
School Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 532 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (not permitting section 1983 action for
"the more general denial of a free appropriate public education"). Two circuits have permitted
actions under section 1983, but they have limited the availability of compensatory damages
in the actions. Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 387 (6th
Cir. 1992) (denying damages under section 1983); Digre v. Roseville Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
623, 841 F.2d 245, 249-50 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); cf. Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220
F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing section 1983 claim for compensatory education for
violation of IDEA).
199. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (holding section 1983 action unavailable
to enforce Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act in light of conclusion that Congress
intended only Secretary of Health and Human Services to enforce Act).
200. The legislative history of the law stresses the difficulty with enforcement of existing
statutory rights. E.g., S. REP. NO. 168, at 8 (1975) (commenting on lack of enforceability of
state law rights). Private enforceability by parents of statutory rights was a principal feature
distinguishing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which became IDEA
in 1990, from the grant-in-aid statutes that preceded it.
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provides damages relief merits consideration, if only because of that
fact. If the section 1983 claim is available for outrageous conduct
such as harassment, the ordinary action under IDEA can be
reserved for placement disputes or other cases in which prospective
relief, tuition reimbursement, or compensatory services are the
most sensible remedies.20 '
C. Common Law
Catharine MacKinnon's early work on sexual harassment drew
on the development of tort liability for harassing conduct.0 2 She
considered common law tort actions inadequate to provide
protection against sex harassment.0 3 Nevertheless, common law
actions have served as precedent for courts finding the existence of
statutory claims for sexual2 4 and racial20 5 harassment.2 6 In the
remedial plan for disability harassment, common law claims have
great importance because of the difficulties of showing intent so as
to trigger school district liability under federal statutory and
201. See Judith Welch Wegner, EducationalRights of Handicapped Children: Three
FederalStatutesand an Evolving Jurisprudence,17 J.L. & EDUC. 625, 675 (1988). As Dean
Wegner notes:
The [IDEAl's principal function is to ensure that handicapped children receive
appropriate educations. Recognition of a reimbursement remedy and the award
of compensatory educational services ... accomplish that end. While the
availability of a damages remedy might serve to penalize school authorities and
thus discourage particular egregious misconduct, this function is adequately
performed by the availability of limited damage remedies under section 504 and
1983 ....
Id. For a criticism of some aspects of Dean Wegner's view, see Mark C. Weber, The
Transformationof the Educationof the HandicappedAct: A Study in the Interpretationof
Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 349,419 n.346 (1990) (questioning proposal to limit
application of section 504 to disputes other than those regarding levels of special education
services).
202. See MACKINNONsupranote 21, at 164-74 (1979) (discussing tort law causes of actions
applicable to sexual harassment).
203. Id. at 173 ("To treat [sexual harassment] as a tort is less simply incorrect than
inadequate.").
204. E.g., Skousen v. Nidy, 367 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1961) (assault and battery action).
205. E.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970) (action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
206. MARcA. FRANKLIN&ROBERTL. RABIN, TORTLAWANDALTERNATIVES 825-28(6th ed.
1996) (providing history of common law racial and sexual harassment claims and discussing
relation to statutory discrimination claims).
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constitutional claims, and the uncertainty whether any given
plaintiff will defeat official immunity defenses to individual
liability. Common law liability, which can be obtained upon the
establishment of elements different from the statutory ones, may be
the only avenue of relief available in some instances. The relevant
claims and defenses pertaining to common law liability thus
deserve explanation.
1. Claims
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is the most obvious
common law tort cause of action in cases of disability harassment.
To establish liability for intentional infliction, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant, by extreme and outrageous conduct,
intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff severe emotional
distress. 7 As the Restatement notes, the "liability clearly does not
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities."0 8 Instead, "[glenerally, the case
is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and
20 9
lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!"
Harassing conduct inflicted on an individual relating to the
individual's disability is clearly included in the tort, as long as
the conduct and the harm reach the requisite level of severity. 10
One of the illustrations in the 1965 Restatement notes that liability
exists for pulling a prank on a gullible person who is "eccentric and
mentally deficient."2 11 A leading authority stresses that a characteristic of the tort is the misuse of power: "[Tihe defendant uses the

207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).

208. Id. cmt. d.
209. Id.
210. But see Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding no cause of action for intentional infliction ofemotional distress under Nebraska law
when teacher daily called child "retarded," 'stupid," and "dumb" in front of class). This
conclusion provoked a strenuous dissent from Judge Hamilton. Id- at 924-27 (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) cmt. f, Mus. 9 (1965).
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inequality [of position] to inflict emotional harm without regard for
the plaintiffs interests."2 12
The power that teachers, principals, and other school personnel
have over children with disabilities gives rise to liability for
outrageous conduct such as belittling students with disabilities who
report assaults, threats, or taunts. In an analogous situation, a
court found that an intentional infliction action lay against a police
officer who belittled a victim's report of sexual assault.2 13 Children
with disabilities in the schools are in a subordinate position not
only with regard to educational personnel, however. They are also
in a subordinate position in the social hierarchy of students. As
noted above, students with disabilities have the lowest social status
of all children in school.2 1 They are therefore uniquely vulnerable
to abuse from other students with greater social prestige, which
abuse in turn reinforces their inferior position.
When teachers or administrators willfully harass students with
disabilities, not only are they liable for their outrageous behavior,
but there is also a basis to find their employers liable through
vicarious responsibility. In addressing the problem of an employer's
tort liability for an employee's hostile environment-sexual harassment,2 15 one authority looks to the test of BurlingtonIndustries,Inc.
v. Ellerth,2 1 6 which determines when an employer is liable for
hostile environment-sexual harassment under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.217
Under the Burlington test, the employer is liable for the harms
caused by its supervisors' creation of a hostile environment, unless
the employer shows that it took reasonable measures to prevent
and correct the conduct, and that the employee-victim unreasonably failed to use the corrective measures the employer made
212. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 304, at 827 (2000).
213. Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308 (D.C. 1994).
214. See Sale & Carey, supranote 61, at 16-17. The conclusion remains true for children
not officially identified by the school system as having disabilities as well as for children with
disabilities mainstreamed in regular education classes. See id. at 17.
215. Hostile environment-sexual harassment is usually distinguished from quid pro quosexual harassment. Meritor Say. Bank v.Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986) (drawing distinction
and recognizing claim for both forms of harassment).

216. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
217. DOBBS, supra note 212, § 335 (discussing standard).
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available. 218 To the extent that this liability is imposed on the basis
of such a test, it might be characterized more as the active
negligence of the school district in entrusting the school employee
with a position in which the harm could be done. The analogy is
thus to other instances of negligent entrustment or supervision.219
In the context of disability harassment, the school district
should be liable in tort at least in the same situations in which an
employer would be liable for hostile environment-sexual harassment under title VII. 22 ° Thus if the district places a person in a

position of authority over the victim, and that person creates an
environment that is pervasively hostile or abusive, the school
district should be liable, and that liability should be defeated only
by the district showing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent
and promptly correct the harassing behavior and that the plaintiff
failed to use opportunities provided for prevention or correction
of the conduct. 22 ' This reasonable care standard and related shift
in the burden of proof would occasion liability in a greater range of
circumstances than a test derived from title IX sexual harassment cases, which require deliberate indifference to known acts
of harassment. 222 It is, nevertheless, more protective of school

districts' interests than a respondeat superior standard.223
2. Remedies
Intentional infliction actions afford money damages. Perhaps
monetary awards can never make a person whole for humiliation or
218. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
219. See, e.g., Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995) (discussing and applying law
regarding tort of negligent supervision); Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989) (discussing
and applying law regarding tort of negligent entrustment).
220. See DOBBS, supra note 212, § 335 (proposing standard for employer tort liability in
sexual harassment cases, but noting usual dependence of liability on statutory standards).
221. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998) (establishing vicarious
liability standard for hostile environment sexual-harassment under title VII); Burlington
Indus., 524 U.S. at 765 (discussing defense based on reasonable care).
222. See supratext accompanying notes 113-21, 142-45 (describing title IX standards for
sexual harassment liability).
223. DOBBS, supra note 212, § 335, at 915-16 ("Although the Court has described this
liability-with-a-defense as vicarious liability, the presence of a defense sharply distinguishes
it from the ordinary case ofvicarious liability, where the employer cannot defend by showing
[the] reasonableness of its actions.").
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insult, but in our society damages are the ordinary means for
compensating a person for all past wrongs, including those that
entail emotional injury.224 Moreover, damages punish the
wrongdoer 2 ' and deter future abuses. 226 They correct the injustice
that has been done by redressing the balance of harm.22 7 hey also
vindicate and reinforce the sense of the community that an injustice
has been done by the defendant's wrongful conduct.2a
An action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not
an exclusive remedy;2 29 frequently, these actions have been
appended to ADA or section 504 claims for disability harassment.2 °
224. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 287 (1935) ("The
jingle of the guinea soothes the hurt that honor feels."). Problems of determining the
appropriate amount of damages are difficult, but they are no more difficult than those
presented by awards of pain and suffering for physical injury. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 185 (2d ed. 1994) ("Dignitary torts, including

assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and batteries that are offensive but do no physical
harm, present valuation problems comparable to those of pain and suffering.").
225. Exemplary damages, which are ordinarily permitted in intentional infliction actions,
are of special importance in this regard. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(2), at
318-19 (abr. 2d ed. 1993) (discussing basis in punishment for exemplary damages remedy);
LAYCOCK, supra note 224, at 5 ("ITihere are punitive remedies: The best known is punitive
damages .... One may question whether punitive remedies ... remedy anything in the usual

sense of correcting, repairing, or fixing. But punitive damages are sometimes necessary to
make it economically feasible ... to enforce important rights.").
226. See DOBBS, supra note 225, § 3.1, at 212 ("Even if the defendant is not subject to
punitive damages, an ordinary 'compensatory' damages judgment can provide an appropriate
incentive to meet the appropriate standard of behavior."); id. § 3.11(3), at 322-27 (discussing
deterrence basis of punitive damages).
227. See JULESL. COLEMAN,RISKSAND WRONGS 317 (1992) ('iTihe dutyto compensate and

the right to compensation for the invasion of rights derive from the principle of corrective
justice."); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 135 (1995) ("With the

materialization of wrongful injury, the only way the defendant can discharge his or her
obligation respecting the plaintiffs right is to undo the effects of the breach of duty."). See
generally Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's
Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) (discussing corrective justice theories).
228. See DOBBS, supranote 225, § 3.1, at 211 ("A sense of justice and support for rights
underlies much ofthe legal system and would certainly seem to justify an award for pain or
for the loss of a valued constitutional right.").
229. The Restatement's definition of the cause of action does not even purport to define the
only circumstances under which tort liability for intentional infliction ofemotional distress
will apply. TheRestatementprovides: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there
may not be other circumstances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

46, caveat (1965).
230. See, e.g., Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
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D. ConstitutionalClaims
Constitutional claims over disability harassment soundin equal
protection and due process. Within due process structures, the
claims may be brought under both substantive and procedural due
process.
1. EqualProtection Claims and Remedies
As is the case with race and sex harassment, constitutional
theories about disability harassment are underdeveloped because
statutes generally provide more convenient avenues for relief."'
Harassment is intentional discrimination, however, and intentional
discrimination may violate the Equal Protection Clause.2 3 2 The
initial question in determining whether a given form of discrimination violates equal protection is what standard of review to
apply. The Supreme Court has asserted that it applies a rationalbasis test in evaluating claims of discrimination based on mental
retardation, although many commentators believe that the leading
case, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,2"' in fact
applies a higher standard of review.234
(BNA) 1043 (N.D. IlM. Feb. 10, 1997) (upholding claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Martinez v. Monaco/Viola, Inc., No. 96 C 4163,1996 WL 547258 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18,
1996) (same); Dutson v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 815 F. Supp. 349, 354 (D. Or. 1993) (same).
231. Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon is in the sexual harassment
case involving Paula Jones and President Clinton. Although the statute of limitations barred
all but the constitutional claims based on harassment, the court used title VII authority in
analyzing the case because case law has not developed the constitutional theories separately.
Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 668 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("Throughout the pendency of this
lawsuit, this Court and the parties have been operating under the assumption, based on the
clear weight of authority, that a § 1983 sexual harassment claim should be analyzed under
the standards developed in similar Title VII litigation."), appealdismissed, 138 F.3d 758 (8th
Cir.).
232. E.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (finding equal protection violation
on the basis of evidence of intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring
showing of intent for equal protection violation).
233. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
234. E.g., ERWINCHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTONAL LAW: P~mNcrPLs AND PoLiClEs § 9.2.3,
at 544 (1997) ("Although the Court [in Cleburne] expressly declared that it was applying
rational basis review, it appears that there was more 'bite' to the Court's approach than
usual for this level of scrutiny."); James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality:How
the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-DiscriminationMandate of the Americans with
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In Cleburne, the Court ruled that a municipality violated equal
protection by not permitting a group home to be established for
persons with mental retardation."5 The Court swept aside
asserted justifications for application of the zoning ordinance
barring the proposed use of the land, including congestion in the
neighborhood, overcrowding of the home, fire hazards, and other
safety concerns. 6 Though the Court correctly noted that these
justifications had not been used to zone out other, comparable uses
of the land, such as nursing homes or fraternities,"'7 the Court
appeared to be ignoring a key aspect of rational-basis review: that
when the rational-basis test applies, the government simply needs
to have a rational connection between the chosen category and the
legitimate goal, 3 ' not pursue the goal consistently across all
categories."' Under the rational-basis test, the government does not
violate equal protection when it approaches a problem piecemeal or
along lines of least political resistance for what it is doing.2 40 Thus
Cleburne in its language might be a rational-basis case, but it
implicitly sets a higher standard.
In a later case, Heller v. Doe,"4 the Supreme Court applied a
garden-variety rational-basis test to sustain a statute that imposed
DisabilitiesAct,52 AIA L. REV.91, 105 (2000) ("It is impossible to square this approach [in

Cleburne] with traditional rational basis review."); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational
Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any OtherName, 62 IND. L.J. 779,796 (1987) ("If
the Court's opinion is viewed in light of what the Court actually did-not what it said it
did-then Justice Marshall was correct in arguing that the Court had essentially employed
intermediate scrutiny."); see also Mark C. Weber,Disability Discrimination in Higher

Education,27 J.C. & U.L. 417,438 (2000) ("In fact, the Court apparently applied something
stricter than a rational-basis test, despite what the opinion itself called it.").
235. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
236. Id. at 449-50.
237. Id. at 450.
238. JOHN E. NOWAK& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 639 (6th ed.
2000) ("[1mf a classification is of this type the Court will ask only whether it is conceivable
that the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not
prohibited by the Constitution.").
239. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (finding no equal protection
violation in ordinance that forbade opticians from fitting eyeglasses without prescription but
permitted drug stores to sell ready-to-wear glasses).
240. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (finding no
equal protection violation in law that forbade truck owners from advertising other businesses
on sides of their trucks but permitted owners to advertise owners' business).
241. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
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a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof and provided
party status for relatives in proceedings for civil commitment of
persons with mental retardation.242 The state's law established that
persons subject to proceedings for civil commitment on the basis of
mental illness had to be shown to meet the test for commitment by
a reasonable-doubt 24standard,
and it denied relatives the status of
3
parties to the case.

Most recently, in Boardof Trustees of the UniversityofAlabama
v. Garrett,' the Court denied that Cleburne established anything
higher than a rational-basis standard for the disability classification it considered. 245 The Court used that conclusion to support
the deduction that the portion of the ADA permitting damages
claims against state governments in employment cases for failure
to accommodate workers violates the Eleventh Amendment. 45
The Court reasoned that Congress lacks the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide damages remedies against
states for violating any prohibition that is not proportional to and
congruent with what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.247 If the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only irrational discrimination
against persons with disabilities, failure to provide what the Court
called "special accommodations" does not violate the Amendment,
for the Court considered it "entirely rational, and therefore
constitutional, for a state employer to conserve scarce financial
resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities
.... ,"248 Thus the Court again affirmed the use of a rational242. Id. at 330.
243. Id. at 315.
244. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
245. Id. at 367.
246. Id. at 274.
247. Id. at 372.
248. Id. The Court's reasoning regarding accommodations is a stunning example of failure
to see beyond one's own point of reference. It may seem rational from the viewpoint of
someone without disabilities to retain or build facilities knowing that they will exclude a
significant fraction ofthe forty-three million Americans with disabilities. From the viewpoint
of someone with a disability, however, it hardly seems rational to fail to make even a
reasonable accommodation, for example, making slightlywider doors andflush entrances for
new buildings so that they can be used by those with wheelchairs and placing portable ramps
in older facilities where feasible.
As a more general matter, people without disabilities frequently overlook the large number
of accommodations made for them. Chief Justice Rehnquist's chair is an accommodation for
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basis test for disability classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Heller and Garrettmight lead to the conclusion that the Court
has once and for all rejected elevated scrutiny for legislation that
disadvantages persons on the basis of disability. This conclusion,
however, may be premature. With regard to Garrett, it is worth
noting that the case was a five-to-four decision, with a strenuous
dissent arguing for a broader view of Cleburne in which state
decision making based on negative attitudes and stereotypes
violates equal protection.249 Two Justices who made up part of the
five-member majority steered clear of the controversy over
Cleburne's meaning and read the conduct that title I of the ADA
sought to correct with regard to state employers more as "failure of
a State to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new
understanding of proper policy" than anything that would violate
the Constitution, seemingly under any test, rational-basis or
elevated scrutinyY.0
For its part, Heller was an unusual case in which the parties
challenging the statute never properly presented the contention
that elevated scrutiny ought to apply.251 It is at least arguable that
people who walk and stand. Some other people wheel their chairs with them. As Harlan
Hahn has written, "[Tihe basic difficulty stems from widespread ignorance of the unequal
implications of everyday surroundings." Harlan Hahn, Equality and the Environment: The
Interpretationof 'ReasonableAccommodations" in the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 17
J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 101, 104 (1993). See generally Mark C. Weber, Beyond the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A NationalEmployment Policyfor People with Disabilities,
46 BuFF. L. REV. 123,135-38,147-50 (1998) (distinguishing nondiscrimination measures such
as reasonable accommodation from more aggressive steps to integrate people with disabilities
in the workplace).
249. See Garrett,531 U.S., at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined the dissent. Even in Cleburne itself, the six-member majority included two
Justices (Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger) who expressed skepticism that an
ordinary rational-basis test applied to the case and three Justices (Justices Marshall,
Brennan, and Blackmun) who would have forthrightly applied elevated scrutiny. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,453-54 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring);
id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. See Garrett,531 U.S., at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined the
concurrence.
251. See Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. at 312,319 (1993) ("Even ifrespondents were correct that
heightened scrutiny applies, it would be inappropriate for us to apply that standard here.
Both parties have been litigating this case for years on the theory of rational-basis review
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the distinctions drawn between people with mental retardation and
those with mental illness would pass an intermediate scrutiny test,
had Heller employed one. A substantial relation between the
distinctions and important governmental goals does not appear that
difficult to demonstrate, for the long-term nature of mental
retardation and the relative ease of showing its existence compared
to mental illness,252 combined with the relative intrusiveness of
forced psychiatric treatment compared with forced commitment
for mental retardation,25 all support the idea of more modest
safeguards for individuals with mental retardation.
In other words, the Court might still be on a road to elevated
scrutiny for disability categories, or at least some disability
categories in some instances. History suggests that an erratic
pattern of decisions, combined with protests by the Court that it is
applying a rational-basis test, may lead to an eventual use of
intermediate scrutiny.254 The Court's modern decisions on sex
discrimination initially used a rational-basis test," s then in one
instance, applied a strict-scrutiny test, 6 then settled down into an
intermediate test,257 though the content of the test remains a
subject of debate.2"' The characteristics of long-term, severe
disability (its permanence and the stigma that attaches to it,
for example) support the application of some form of elevated
scrutiny, as Justice Marshall's opinion in Cleburne convincingly
demonstrated.259 The concern that some legislation beneficial to
people with disabilities might be put at constitutional risk can be
handled by the flexible nature of an intermediate scrutiny test.260
252. See id. at 322-24 (describing significance of distinction).
253. Id. at 324-26 (describing significance of distinction).
254. See NOWAK&ROTUNDA,supra note 238, § 14.20 (describing evolution ofintermediate

scrutiny in sex classification cases).
255. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
256. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion).
257. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
258. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,531 (1996) (requiring"exceedingly
persuasive justification" for treating sexes differently), with id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring) (criticizing use of "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard).
259. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461-65 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing history of discrimination
and other factors supporting application of elevated scrutiny).
260. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 238, § 14.23, at 834 (describing preservation of
"benign classifications" on the basis of sex under intermediate review).
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Applying intermediate scrutiny to disability harassment yields
the unavoidable conclusion that the harassing conduct violates
equal protection. The government singles out an individual for
ridicule or physical intimidation or other harm simply because
that person is different and vulnerable. There is no substantial
relationship to any important goal that the government is actually
pursuing.2
Even if that position were disputed, however, it is hardly
necessary to apply elevated scrutiny to conclude that disability
harassment in the public schools violates equal protection. The
rational-basis test requires that the government classification be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental end. In cases of
harassment, the government singles out children with disabilities
for mistreatment. No legitimate governmental end is served.
Indulging popular prejudices is not a legitimate governmental
goal,2 62 nor is the "bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group."26 As James Leonard has recently pointed out, the Court's
condemnation of the antigay initiative in Romer v. Evans 264 in 1996
shows that disadvantaging unpopular groups for the simple sake of
261. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (applying intermediate scrutiny to
require genuine, "exceedingly persuasive justification" for government action and substantial
relation between category and goal).
262. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (finding no legitimate governmental
purpose inplacingunique political disadvantage on gays and lesbians); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding that avoiding potential problems from racial bias in population
fails to constitute permissible ground for use ofrace in child custody determination); see also
Cleburfie, 473 U.S. at 448 ("[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating
a home for the mentally retarded differently."). This reasoning is, of course, independent of
the reasoning by which the Court in Cleburne dismissed the other justifications for the
zoning decision. The dismissal of the other reasons is what might be characterized as
scrutiny that is stricter than the rational-basis test.
263. Cleburne,473 U.S. at 447 (stating that objectives such as "'a bare.., desire to harm
a politically unpopular group' are not legitimate state interests") (quoting United States
Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). As Professor Sunstein explains:
When the government operates to benefit A and burden B, it may do so only if
it is prepared to justify its decision by reference to a public value.
... The institutionthat made the discrimination must be attemptingto remedy
a perceived public evil, and must not be responding only to the interests or
preferences of some of its constituents.
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, PrivateInterests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
Sup. CT. REv. 127, 134.
264. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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so doing continues to be a clear violation of equal protection. 265
Disadvantaging for the sake of doing so is precisely what
harassment does. Garrett further reinforces the conclusion that
government-sponsored or tolerated harassment violates equal
protection by reaffirming Cleburne's central holding that irrational
conduct motivated by negative attitudes against people with
disabilities is indeed a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 266 The
concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy took special pains to
distinguish what the Court said did not clearly violate the
Constitution from conduct based on "malicious ill will," which
clearly does. 6
Courts are beginning to recognize that disability harassment in
the schools constitutes a violation of equal protection. In Smith v.
Maine School Administrative District No. 6,68 the plaintiff, a
student with mental retardation and other disabilities, alleged that
the assistant principal excluded her from a school dance because of
her disabilities; that room was not made for her to sit with the rest
of the school chorus during a performance until her father
intervened; and that at the instruction of the chorus director, a
fellow student directed her to stop singing too loudly during the
performance. The incidents resulted in students ridiculing and
shunning the plaintiff.269 The court found that the allegations gave
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent, and that if a rationalbasis test were applied to the way in which the defendants treated
the plaintiff on the basis of her disability, the allegations were
sufficient to support the conclusion that defendants violated equal
protection.2 70

265. Leonard, supra note 234, at 108 ("The principle that disadvantaging unpopular
groups for its own sake violates equal protection was reasserted by the recent opinion in
Romer v. Evans."); see also Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The PariahPrinciple, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996) (contending that government violates equal protection by
treating people as pariahs); Joseph S. Jackson, PersonsofEqualWorth: Romer v. Evans and
the PoliticsofEqualProtection,45 UCLA L. REV. 453 (1997) (arguing that equal protection
imposes principle of equal worth of individuals).
266. See Board of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4, 367 (2001).
267. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268. No. 00-284-P-C, 2001 WL 68305 (D. Me. Jan. 29, 2001).
269. Id. at *2.
270. Id. at *6.
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Damages are an appropriate remedy for equal protection
violations. In general, proof of equal protection and other
constitutional violations brought under section 1983 gives rise to
the full range of remedial
options, including compensatory and
271
punitive damages.
2. Due Process Claims andRemedies
Abuse ofpower by individuals with governmental authority over
persons subject to them violates due process of law. Governmental
creation of a danger to an individual may support liability for the
resulting harm. For example, in Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public
Schools, 2 72 the Tenth Circuit upheld a substantive due process claim
based on a child's suicide when school officials were on notice of a
child's suicidal propensities, but they suspended him and drove him
home where they knew he had access to firearms, without
determining whether an adult was present there.2 7 Liability for
violations of substantive due process may also be premised on the
existence of a special relationship between the school officials and
the victim, such as when the child is in the school's custody. For
example, in another Tenth Circuit case, Sutton v. Utah State School
for the Deafand Blind, 7 4 the court held that the plaintiff stated a
271. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (finding punitive damages appropriate in section
1983 case).
272. 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Maxwell v. Sch. Dist., 53 F. Supp. 2d 792-93
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding state-created-danger standard met in case involving rape by
classmates when substitute teacher told unruly class she did not care what they did if they
did not bother her, remained -idle during attacks, and participated in locking children in
classroom).
273. The contours of this doctrine remain uncertain, but they appear to require the
affirmative creation of danger, rather than inaction in the face of danger. For example, the
Supreme Court found that no due process violation occurred when a social service
department repeatedly received reports of a father physically abusing a child, but took no
action, and the father eventually beat the child so severely that he suffered permanent brain
injuries leaving him profoundly mentally retarded. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
274. 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Waechter v. School Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F.
Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991). In Waechter, the court denied a motion to dismiss a claim for
violation of substantive due process against a teacher, principal, superintendent, district, and
school board when the plaintiffs alleged that the teacher, who knew their son had serious
heart impairments, forced the child to sprint for 350 yards for talking in line on the
playground. The child suffered cardiac arrhythmia and died. The court found the child to be
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substantive due process claim against the principal of a state school
in his individual capacity, when the principal failed to adopt or
implement a policy or training program to prevent sexual assaults
on a child with disabilities after the principal was placed on notice
of a previous assault on the same victim by the same offender.
On analogy to these cases, substantive due process liability
exists for disability harassment at least in instances in which
serious mental or physical harm is visited on a child with
disabilities in school and the school, as in Armijo, is aware of the
dangers and places the child in a dangerous position, such as an
unsupervised classroom or playground, without taking precautions
to prevent abuse on account of the child's difference. Similarly,
substantive due process liability exists when, as in Sutton, the child
is in a custodial relationship, the school officials are on notice of the
danger to the child, and they take no precautions to prevent
harassment.
There also exists a sense in which disability harassment, even
in ordinary, rather than more extreme, cases constitutes a
deprivation of procedural due process. Procedural due process
applies when government makes an individualized determination
that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. The Supreme
Court has found that suspending a child for a disciplinary infraction
violates procedural due process if the child does not receive some
kind of hearing before the punishment.2Y Harassment by teachers,
in the custody ofthe defendants, and found the conduct sufficiently outrageous to violate the
constitutional duty. See id. at 1010.
275. Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1226. Some courts, however, have rejected substantive due
process claims based on abuse of children in custodial situations if the child is voluntarily
enrolled at the school or if the only coercion is that of compulsory school attendance laws.
E.g., Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no liability and upholding
Eleventh Amendment immunity of superintendent in his capacity as a state actor in case
concerning sexual assaults at state school against child voluntarily enrolled there, despite
superintendent's knowledge of ongoing attacks); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.
1992) (finding no liability when boy was left unsupervised, resulting in strangulation).
276. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,566 (1975) (holdingthat procedural due process requires
notice and hearing before suspension from public school); see also Quackenbush v. Johnson
City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding due process violation based on
allegation of deprivation of special education hearing rights). Though post-deprivation
remedies may suffice for some school discipline, the procedural due process right is still
applicable. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (finding no due process deprivation
when corporal punishment in school remained subject to later remedies).
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principals, and others with governmental authority over a child
deprives the child of a liberty and property interest in receiving
educational services. 7 When a teacher ridicules a child or
physically abuses her, the teacher is singling the child out for
mistreatment without affording the child any fair opportunity to
contest whether the harm is merited.
In one of the two cases that led to congressional passage of the
law that is now IDEA, a court found a violation of procedural due
process in the conduct of District of Columbia schools in excluding
children from regular classes, without a hearing or other
procedures, on the grounds that they had behavior problems,
7 If
mental retardation, emotional disturbance, or hyperactivity."
exclusion from school on these bases requires a hearing, so too does
singling out a child for harassment on the same basis, official action
that interferes with the child's enjoyment of the right to attend
school and profit from it.
Damages are an appropriate remedy for violations of due
process.279 Even when the denial of due process causes no
discernable harm, the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy of nominal
damages.280
As emphasized above, harassment may also be viewed as a form
of retaliation: the child is punished for exercising her right to
attend public school like everyone else. 28 ' Had she not asserted that
right, had she stayed at home or not ventured into the mainstream,
teachers (or peers with the tacit or explicit approval of school
personnel) would not have mistreated her. Claims for retaliation for

277. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 565 (flndingprotectedinterestin continued attendance at public
school).
278. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866,875 (D.D.C. 1972) ("[Mlany [children] are
suspended or expelled from regular schooling or specialized instruction or reassigned without
any prior hearing and are given no periodic review thereafter. Due process of law requires
classification into a special program."). The
a hearing prior to exclusion, termination [or]
court also found that the exclusion of children with disabilities from public school violates
the equal protection component of due process. Id.
279. Quackenbush, 716 F.2d at 148 (upholding damages claim for alleged due process
violation based on deprivation of special education hearing rights).
280. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (permitting nominal damages claim for
suspension that took place without hearing but with just cause).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90 (discussing retaliation claims).
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the exercise of statutory rights may constitute
First Amendment
2 2
violations giving rise to damages relief.

III. DEFENSES TO DISABILITY HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The discussion of disability harassment claims suggests that the
conduct is actionable under any number of theories. Although some
courts succeed in misunderstanding the nature of the remedy and
dismiss valid cases on that basis, the greater number of cases are
dismissed on the ground of various defenses to liability. These
defenses include failure to exhaust administrative remedies; the
application of official immunity; and the application of other
immunity doctrines, including Eleventh Amendment immunity of
state governmental agencies. Many courts, however, misapply these
defenses in dismissing harassment actions.
A. Exhaustion ofAdministrativeRemedies
The exhaustion requirement poses the single greatest obstacle
to damages claims for disability harassment. Some courts recognize
exceptions to exhaustion for these cases and properly treat the
claims as discrimination cases. Other courts do not appreciate the
significance of the discrimination at work and apply the exhaustion
defense without serious consideration of the nature of the claim.
1. The Exhaustion Requirement
To bring a civil action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 for violations of
IDEA, the plaintiff must be a "party aggrieved by the findings and
decision" of the hearing procedure created by the statute. 21 This
restriction on who can sue operates as an administrative exhaustion
requirement, keeping anyone who has not pursued the hearings
procedure from filing an action under section 1415.2 Furthermore,
282. E.g., Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382,387 (6th Cir.
1992) (acknowledging merit of claim but finding allegation of retaliation not supported by
facts of case).
283. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000).
284. See generally MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAw AND LITIGATION TREATISE

2002]

DISABILITY HARASSMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

1135

the statutory amendment" 5 that overruled Smith v. Robinson2 6
and permitted section 504, section 1983, and, once the ADA was
passed, title II actions, provides that "before the filing of a civil
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under
[section 14151, the procedures [for administrative hearings and
appeals] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required
had the action been brought under this subchapter."28 7 Although
Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to be flexible so that
meritorious cases would get ajudicial hearing,58 many courts have
§ 21.8 (1992 & Supp. VIII 2000) (discussing administrative exhaustion in special education

cases). The policies behind administrative exhaustion include maximization ofthe expertise
ofadministrators and economy in the use ofprocedural mechanisms to challenge government
conduct. Id. (collecting authorities). Ideally, the scope of an exhaustion requirement would
conform to these policies. Because Congress has resolved the question of the operation of the
IDEA exhaustion requirement, this Article approaches the issue as a statutory, rather than
a policy matter. It may be noted, however, that futility of exhaustion constitutes a valid
excuse both in policy and under the legislation.
285. The amendment codifies the HCPA. See supranotes 182-98 and accompanying text
(discussing HCPA).
286. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
287. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2000).
288. The legislative history ofthe predecessor ofIDEA, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, includes a statement by Senator Harrison Williams, its principal author, that
"exhaustion of the administrative procedures established under this part should not be
required ... in cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical
matter." 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975). When the HCPA restored section 504 and other
remedies to IDEA cases in 1986, the additional remedies were made subject to the same
exhaustion obligation that applies to the Act. Senator Simon and Representative Miller, who
managed the bill, set down what Congress understood about exhaustion in special education
cases:
It is important to note that there are certain situations in which it is not
appropriate to require the exhaustion of EHA [Education of the Handicapped
Act, now IDEA] administrative remedies before filing a civil law suit. These
include complaints that: First, an agency has failed to provide services specified
in the child's individualized educational program [IEP]; second, an agency has
abridged or denied a handicapped child's procedural rights-for example,
failure to implement required procedures concerning least restrictive
environment or convening of meetings; three, an agency had adopted a policy
or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law, or
where it would otherwise be futile to use the due process procedures-for
example, where the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief
sought; and four, an emergency situation exists-for example, failure to provide
services during the pendency ofproceedings, or a complaint concerning summer
school placement which would not likely be resolved in time for the student to
take advantage of the program.
131 CONG. REC. 21,392-93 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon). Representative Miller
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applied the rule rigidly, barring cases even when the plaintiffs
present persuasive reasons for excusing exhaustion."
2. Application of Exhaustion to HarassmentCases
In a number of cases involving allegations of disability harassment or closely analogous claims, courts have dismissed cases for
lack of administrative exhaustion.2 90 The most prominent of these
elaborated: "Nleither I nor others who wrote the law intended that parents should be forced
to expend valuable time and money exhausting unreasonable or unlawful administrative
hurdles .... "Id. at 31,376.

289. Perhaps the most striking of these cases are those in which the plaintiffs challenge
a practice of general applicability that the hearing officer (who, according to 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3), must be independent of the educational agency) lacks the power to change.
Despite the futility ofexhaustion and applicability of the statements of Senator Simon and
Representative Miller, courts in recent years have frequently dismissed cases of this type on
the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. E.g., Doe v. Arizona Dep't ofEduc.,
111 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring exhaustion in action over failure to provide special
education to eligible inmates of county jail); Gardner v. School Bd., 958 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.
1992) (requiring exhaustion in challenge to policy not to permit taping of individualized
education program meetings); Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809 (10th Cir.
1989) (requiring exhaustion in case challenging use oftime-out rooms for students in special
education programs); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933 (6th
Cir. 1989) (overturning preliminary injunction against operation of rule preventing
participation in sports by child who transferred between schools when transfer was allegedly
caused by learning disabilities; holding that lawsuit was subject to dismissal for failure to
exhaust state administrative remedies); Radcliffe v. School Bd., 38 F.Supp. 2d 994 (M.D. Fla.
1999) (requiring exhaustion in dispute over scheduling of individualized education program
meeting outside of school hours). Contrary to what the HCPA sponsors said of congressional
intent, many other recent cases have required exhaustion even though hearing rights or
other procedural guarantees have been violated. E.g., Doe v. Walker County Bd. ofEduc., No.
A.4:95-CV-0219-H, 1997 WL 866983 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1997) (requiring exhaustion even
though district failed to develop individualized education programs to provide basis for
hearing); W.L.G. v. Houston County Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1997)
(holding that claim for failure to obey settlement agreement needed to be exhausted); Koster
v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ., 921 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Md. 1996) (requiring exhaustion
despite claimed inadequacy of notice).
290. E.g., Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98 C 3838, 1999 WL 90625 (N.D. Il. Feb. 9, 1999)
(involving ridicule and humiliation by teacher of student with visual impairment); Franklin
v. Frid, 7 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (involving aide's physical and psychological
abuse of child with cerebral palsy); Shields v. Helena Sch. Dist. No. 1, 943 P.2d 999 (Mont.
1997) (involving exclusion from trip, humiliation, and name-calling by teachers). In two
cases, courts dismissed cases brought by parents based on allegations of retaliation, despite
the obvious fact that the administrative process could provide no useful relief to the parents.
See Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2000); Babicz v. School Bd., 135
F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1998). In Weber, the court relied on the plaintiffs' failure to allege that
exhaustion was burdensome or futile. Weber, 212 F.3d at 52-53. InBabicz, the court appears
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is CharlieF. v. Board of Education,29 ' the case about the fourthgrade encounter sessions in which students were encouraged to
vent their rage at Charlie. The court ruled that the case had to be
dismissed on exhaustion grounds,292 even though the child was no
longer in the school system, was not suing under IDEA,29 ' and was
asking only damages as a remedy. It declared that the portion of
the exhaustion requirement referring to relief available means
relief for events or conditions at issue in the suit, not relief
preferred by the plaintiff.29 ' The court concluded that some useful
forms of relief that were not asked for, such as compensatory
education or services, would be available from the administrative
process even though damages were not.295
The court's reasoning that the usefulness of any potential relief
in an IDEA proceeding triggers the duty to exhaust is impossible to
square with the relevant language of the HCPA. The HCPA phrase
"seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter" clearly
refers to the civil action filed by the plaintiff, not a hypothetical
action that the plaintiffcouldhave brought.296 The court neatly read
the word "seeking" out of the statute. Moreover, the court's
argument about the usefulness of alternate relief is weakened by
the fact that the child was no longer in the district at the time of
the suit, and then toppled by the reality that compensatory services
not to have been aware that Congress overruled Smith v. Robinson, or perhaps it was not
aware that the parent was suing on her own behalf as well as that of her children. See
Babicz, 135 F.3d at 1422.
291. 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996). For more on Charlie F., see supra text accompanying
notes 7-9.
292. CharlieF., 98 F.3d at 993.
293. Claims were advanced for violations of the Constitution, section 504, title II of the
ADA, and state law. Id at 991.
294. Id ("The statute speaks of available relief, and what relief is 'available' does not
necessarily depend on what the aggrieved party wants. Certainly not in litigation.").
295. Id. at 992-93.
296. 20 US.C. § 1415(1) (2000). The context clarifies the meaning:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990..., title V ofthe Rehabilitation Act..., or other Federal
laws ... except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking
relief that is also available under this subchapter, [the administrative]
procedures [required by] this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as
would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
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will never make a victim whole for humiliation and intimidation.29
If they did, courts would award services in intentional tort cases,
not damages.298
Courts have frequently excused exhaustion in cases involving
ADA or section 504 claims, as well as cases in which violations of
IDEA are asserted either through section 1983 or the statute itself.
Many of these cases use reasoning that casts doubt on that
employed in Charlie F. A leading case is W.B. v. Matula,299
discussed above in connection with section 1983 claims to enforce
IDEA. The plaintiffs alleged protracted delays in the evaluation of
and delivery of services to a child who was eventually diagnosed
with neurological impairments and other disabilities. The court
noted that the mere assertion of a section 1983 claim does not
excuse exhaustion, but it stressed that the plaintiffs in the case
were seeking damages and that damages were not available in an
IDEA administrative proceeding." 0 Accordingly, following the
statement in the HCPA legislative history that "'[eixhaustion of
administrative remedies would ... be excused where ... resort to

those proceedings would be futile,'" the court ruled that exhaustion
was not required.01 The court also pointed out that evidentiary
matters concerning evaluation, classification, and placement were
no longer in dispute, and thus there was no justification for
exhaustion for developing a record on those issues. 0 2
Harassment cases present an even stronger basis for excusing
exhaustion than does W.B. For one thing, the cases are likely not to
include an IDEA claim at all, but instead to be framed in terms of

297. See supra text accompanying notes 122-60 (discussing appropriate relief in
harassment cases). This characteristic ofharassment claims distinguishes them from cases
having to do with educational methodology or levels of educational services, in which a
damages claim might be pled simply to circumvent the administrative process. See Covington
v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2000) (excusing exhaustion;
distinguishing cases "simply [Iappending a claim for damages").
298. See supra text accompanying notes 207-30 (discussing damages remedies in cases
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress).
299. 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995); see supra text accompanying notes 176-86 (discussing

W.B.).
300. W.B., 67 F.3d at 495-96.
301. Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
302. Id.
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violations of section 504, the ADA, and constitutional violations.0 3
Any IDEA claims will be, like those in W.B., section 1983 damages
claims for violations of the statute. Even more than in a dispute
over failure to evaluate and provide services to a child, matters of
deliberate harassment go beyond the core concerns of IDEA and its
main goal of promptly getting adequate services to children.' 4 As
a second matter, the propriety of damages relief for harassment is
far clearer than it is for delays.305 As the W.B. court said in
discussing relief, compensatory services maybe a sufficient remedy
for delays in some cases.3 08 6 Thus, even if one were to work the kind

of changes in the text of section 1415(1) that the CharlieF. court did
and ignore the drafters' stress on the relief actually sought in the
case, exhaustion should be excused because the proper relief in a
harassment case-damages-is not available from the IDEA
administrative process.
An approach similar to that of W.B. was adopted in Covington
v. Knox County School System,"°7 the case in which a child was
routinely locked in a darkened, vault-like time-out room. The court
declared that in a case in which the child's "injuries are wholly in
the past, and therefore money damages are the only remedy that
can make him whole[,] proceeding through the state's
administrative process would be futile and is not required before
the plaintiff can file suit in federal court."308 The court upheld a
claim for violation of substantive due process. 0 9
The W.B. decision preceded CharlieF.;Covington apparently did
not consider Charlie F. relevant and did not cite it. In the years
since the CharlieF. decision, most courts excusing exhaustion in
harassment cases have distinguished the case, rather than
303. See McKayv. Winthrop Bd. ofEduc., No. 96-131-B, 1997 WL 816505, at *2-*3 (D. Me.
June 6,1997) (holding that section 504 andADAdamages claims forfailure to make building
accessible need not be exhausted; noting absence of IDEA claim and absence of availability

of damages pursuant to IDEA).
304. See supratext accompanying notes 161-70 (discussing IDEA claims).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 148-60 (discussing appropriate relief for
harassment).
306. W.B., 67 F.3d at 495.
307. 205 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2000). For more on Covington, see supra text accompanying

notes 27-28.
308. Covington, 205 F.3d at 917 (citation omitted).

309. Id. at 913.
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confronting it head on. Thus in Witte v. Clark County School
District,1 0 the case in which a student was force-fed, choked, and
otherwise abused, the court said that the situation was different
from CharlieF. in that the parties in CharlieF. did not ultimately
agree on a different placement, unlike Witte, in which the new
placement came about during informal administrative
procedures. 1 1 The court also distinguished CharlieF. on the ground
that damages there were considered a substitute for remedial
services, whereas in Witte, "Plaintiff expressly eschews any claim
for monetary damages to provide, or to be measured by the cost of,
remedial services. Rather, the claim for damages is retrospective
only."" Finally, the court considered a case involving primarily
physical abuse to be distinguishable from one involving primarily
verbal abuse."' i The court permitted the section 504 and ADA
claims to stand. 14
In Padillav. School DistrictNo. 1,s'5 the case of the child kept
in a stroller in a closet, the court also distinguished Charlie F.,
reading the case as a requirement that when "the IDEA's ability to
remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be
required in order to give educational agencies an initial opportunity
to ascertain and alleviate the alleged problem." 16 The court said
that damages for the fractured skull and other injuries the child
sustained were not redressable through the IDEA administrative
process and permitted an ADA damages claim to proceed.317
That these decisions distinguished Charlie F., rather than
disagreeing with it, does not lend support to the Charlie F.
approach and its judicial rewriting of section 1415(1). In fact, the
first two distinctions relied on in the Witte decision are thin,
depending entirely on how the plaintiff chose to characterize the
310. 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999). For more on Witte, see supra text accompanying notes
10-12.
311. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275-76.
312. Id. at 1276.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). For more on Padilla,see supra text accompanying
notes 187-91.
316. Padilla,233 F.3d at 1274 (citation omitted).
317. Id. at 1274-75.
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dispute with the school district and the relief being sought. The
third distinction, also relied on in Padilla,that the injuries were
physically as well as verbally inflicted, is dubious in that Charlie
also suffered physical attacks from his classmates and the plaintiffs
in both Witte and Padillaalso suffered abuse other than physical
assaults. Moreover, the courts never explained why psychological
abuse is any less a matter for the judicial system than physical
abuse. Effectively, the courts have limited the application of Charlie
F. in their circuits in cases involving disability harassment.
When courts assimilate disabilityharassment into disputes over
services and methodology and apply an exhaustion requirement
intended for those cases, they fail to treat with necessary
seriousness the real injuries that harassment inflicts. These real
injuries are best addressed by court actions for damages, and under
the language of the special education law as well as the evidence of
the intentions of its drafters, exhaustion of administrative remedies
should not be required.
B. Official Immunity
Official immunity also bars some disability harassment claims.
Public-official defendants may claim immunity from section 1983
claims318 for violation of the Constitution if their conduct was not
318. As Gary Gildin convincingly demonstrates, ifpublic officials maybe found personally
liable under section 504, title II ADA, or IDEA damages claims (as opposed to section 1983
claims for constitutional violations), official immunity should not be available as a defense.
Gildin, supra note 122, at 900. Gildin notes that the disability statutes were not modeled
after section 1983, that common law immunities present at the time of section 1983's
adoption had been limited or abolished at the time the disability statutes were passed, and
that immunity is inconsistent with the legislative purpose behind the statutes. Id. But see
P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1045 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that immunity protects
employees of state department ofmental health from section 504 and IDEAdamages claims);
East Penn Sch. Dist. v. Scott B., No. 97-1989,1999 WL 178361, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25,1999)
(finding that qualified immunity protected individual-capacity defendants from IDEA
damages claim). As noted above, although controversy exists whether individual liability is
permitted under the general nondiscrimination provisions of the ADA and section 504,
individuals clearlymaybe liable underthe retaliation and coercionprovisions. See supratext
accompanying note 123. For the reasons Gildin identifies, individual defendants liable under
the ADA should be unable to claim qualified immunity to avoid that liability. The discussion
in the text in the current section of this Article addresses immunity from liability for
constitutional violations made actionable under section 1983.
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contrary to established law a reasonable person would have known
of at the time the conduct occurred. 9 In several cases, courts have
immunized public school teachers and administrators from liability
for violating the Constitution by engaging in conduct that some
might consider analogous to engaging in or tolerating disability
harassment. Harassment, however, is behavior that is contrary to
established law, and so it should not be protected by official
immunity against constitutional claims.
Courts have immunized defendants from damages liability in
cases alleging violations of substantive due process by improperly
using a body-wrapping technique on a child with severe mental
retardation, 2 ' by failing to prevent a child in a state residential
school for the deaf from being sexually assaulted by an older
classmate, 2 ' and by confining a young man with mild mental
retardation and behavior problems in a state institution where his
liberty was unjustifiably restricted and he was sexually abused by
322
an employee.
Without conceding that the courts properly applied qualified
immunity in each of these situations, it is easy to conclude that
perpetrating or condoning disability harassment is a different case,
319. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-20 (1982) (emending previous good-faith
immunity test to create objective standard, on account of difficulty of applying subjective
standard). The current doctrine of official immunity has been subjected to severe criticism.
See, e.g., PETERW. LOW &JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,FEDERAL COURTSAND THE LAW OF FEDERALSTATERELATIONS 944-53(4th ed. 1998) (summarizing arguments and collecting authorities).
320. Heidemann v. Bother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1029 (8th Cir. 1996). The technique involved
wrapping the child tightly in a blanket so that she could not move her arms or legs. Id. at
1025. The defendants contended that the technique was a proper one to provide the child
with warmth and stability. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the technique was used for
prolonged periods as a substitute for educational and habilitative programs, and cited an
instance in which the child's mother found the child wrapped in a blanket on the floor, with
flies crawling in and around her mouth and nose. Id. at 1026. The court ruled that use of the
technique was not a substantial departure from the application of accepted practice
standards of which the defendants should have known. Id. at 1029.
321. Spiveyv. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994), withdrawninparton recons., 41 F.3d
1497 (11th Cir. 1995).
322. P.C., 913 F.2d at 1033. The court also found that defendants were immune from
liability on claims based on violation of procedural due process and the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1043-44. In Smith v. Maine,discussed supra text accompanying notes 268-70, the court
found that the individual defendants were shielded by qualified immunity from liability for
the equal protection violation, but it relied solely on the plaintiffs' failure to oppose the
defense. Smith v. Maine Admin. Sch. Dist. No. 6, No. 00-284-P-C, 2001 WL 68305, at *7 (D.
Me. Jan. 29, 2001).
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one to which qualified immunity does not apply. In none of the
three cases that applied qualified immunity did the individual
defendants act out of malice or hostility toward people with
disabilities: In each case the court stressed that the defendants did
not depart significantly from professional standards without just
cause, 2 ' did not engage in deliberate indifference to the known
needs of the plaintiffs,32 4 or did not fail to protect an individual for
whom the duty to protect was clearly established.3 25 Actions
undertaken out of malice or hostility, or inactions that constitute
deliberate indifference, form the foundation of claims for disability
harassment. Malicious conduct and deliberate indifference to
known harassment engaged in by others are violations of
established rights of which any teacher or school official should be
26
aware.

3

Accordingly, in a number of cases closely analogous to disability
harassment situations, courts have rejected defenses based on
qualified immunity. Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public Schools3 2 is
the case involving the child who had told a school aide his suicidal
thoughts, but was suspended by the principal, driven home by
a counselor without notice to his parents, and killed himself.
323. E.g.,Heidemann,84F.3dat 1029 ("Certainly, evenifthe blanketwrappingtreatment
did constitute a substantial departure from professional norms (which it did not), a
reasonable official would not have known that to be true."); P.C., 913 F.2d at 1043 ("The
requirement that professional judgment be exercised is not an invitation to a court reviewing
it to ascertain whether in fact the best course of action was taken.") (citations omitted).
324. E.g.,P.C., 913 F.2d at 1045 ("Again, there are simply no facts on this record showing
deliberate indifference.").
325. See, e.g., Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1527. The Spivey court stated:
Because no reported case addressed this kind of residential school, the district
court and the parties were forced to interpret analogous cases. The district
court held that no liberty interest was implicated. On the other hand, we hold
that our analysis leads us to an opposite conclusion. Where there is so much
room for differing interpretations, we cannot say the contours of the right were
clearly established.
Id.
326. Compare Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding deliberate indifference when school officials responded to continued reports of peer
sexual harassment by talking to offenders without taking more aggressive action), with
Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that immunity barred sex
discrimination action against individual defendants in case involving rape of student when
prompt and thorough response was made to earlier complaint).
327. 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). For more on Armijo, see supra text accompanying
notes 272-73.
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There, the court of appeals ruled that the principal and guidance
counselor increased the danger to the child in violation of the
child's established rights."2 In situations in which teachers or
administrators know of dangers of peer harassment but place the
children with disabilities in unsupervised situations with students
who are prone to harm them because of their disabling conditions,
the school personnel knowingly place the children in danger in
violation of established rights.
In other situations, such as protracted delays in provision of
services.29 and failure to provide required procedures," courts have
found that defendants have violated established rights and forfeited
official immunity. Harassing children or permitting the harassment
to take place would appear to be a clearer violation of rights of
which the administrators should have been aware than the
omissions that cost defendants their immunity in those cases. 331
Municipal corporations such as school districts do not enjoy the
protection of official immunity.112 The courts have reasoned that
leaving an injured plaintiff without a remedy in order to induce
persons to undertake public service is an appropriate tradeoff for
immunity from personal, not corporate liability.33 Hence, school
328. Id. at 1262-64. The court found evidence from which a reasonablejury could conclude
that the defendants "acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk of suicide, and...
such conduct, if true, when viewed in total, possibly could be construed as conscienceshocking. ... In addition, these facts taken as true also could be construed to show .. that
[defendants] increased the risk of harm to Armijo." Id. at 1264.
329. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (denying summary judgment on basis of
immunity upon finding that failure to identify and evaluate child for more than six months
and other violations could be viewed as violation of clearly established law).
330. Mason v. Schenectady City Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215, 220-21 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that long delay in provision of services and failure to afford notice of procedural
rights constitute violations of established rights that overcome claim of immunity).
331. See also Padilla v. School Dist. No. 1, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (D. Colo. 1999) (finding no
qualified immunity for behavior specialist, special education teacher, and paraprofessional
when child was restrained contrary to IEP and sustained injury; upholding immunity for
school nurse), affid inpt., rev'd in pt. on other grounds,and remanded, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th
Cir. 2000); Bills v. Homer Consol. Sch. Dist., 959 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that
principal's daily interrogations of fifth-grader for five days after another child admitted to
conduct in question were sufficientlyunreasonable that Fourth Amendment claim would not
be dismissed on ground of immunity).
332. Owenv. City ofIndependence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding thatmunicipalities do not
have official immunity).
333. Id. at 653 & n.37 (explaining distinction).
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districts may not claim immunity from liability for disability
harassment.
C. Other Immunity Doctrines
Two immunity doctrines that operate to bar some disability
harassment claims are general governmental immunity from
common law liability and Eleventh Amendment immunity of state
defendants in federal court.
1. General Governmental Immunity from Common Law
Claims
Common law claims for disability harassment are an important
part of any plan to remedy harassment in the schools, but they are
not available in all states. Various states confer immunity on school
districts or their officers for all sorts of tort claims, and these
immunities may be construed to bar claims for failure to prevent
disability harassment.3 4 Numerous courts, however, have ruled
that immunities do not apply to causes of action for failure to
prevent assaults or other intentional injuries. 3 5 In states whose
334. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 851-52 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262
(2000) (finding that statutory immunity barred negligence and gross negligence action
against school district superintendent and other officials in case involving rape of student);
Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding no liability against
district officials for school bus driver's sexual assault on student; applying discretionary
function doctrine); Sargiv. Kent CityBd. ofEduc., 70 F.3d 907,913 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying
statutory immunity to dismiss claims for failure to provide emergency medical aid to child
on school bus); Estes v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 98 C 2197, 1998 WL 516107, at *1 (N.D.
IM.Aug. 13,1998) (relying on state immunity statute to dismiss claim against school district
for sexual assault by students); Sanchez v. School Dist. 9-R, 902 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1995) (finding tort claim over injury in mainstreamed physical education class barred
by governmental immunity); Brownv. Houston Sch. Dist., 704 So.2d 1325,1327 (Miss. 1997)
(finding sovereign immunity barred wrongful death action against school district); Tinkham
v. Groveport-Madison Local Sch. Dist., 602 N.E.2d 256, 262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding
district protected by sovereign immunity in case regarding sexual assault of student by cab
driver).
335. Doe v. Escambia County Sch. Bd., 599 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. App. 1992) (reversing
dismissal of action based on abduction and rape of child with disabilities, finding duty to
supervise students to be operational, not discretionary function); Hernandez v. Rapid Bus
Co., 641 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Il. App. 1994) (reversing summary judgment for bus company in
action for damages over assault and rape on school bus); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v.
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immunity doctrines are limited in that fashion, plaintiffs are free
to bring analogous common law claims for harassment.
Immunity doctrines undermine the social objectives of tort law
and block the tort system's shifting of losses from the innocent
victim to the wrongdoer."3 6 Governmental entities and officers
inflict losses that are every bit as real as those inflicted by
private actors not shielded by immunities. For these reasons,
courts and legislatures in many jurisdictions have limited or
abolished a number of immunity doctrines, most notably immunity
for charitable institutions 3 7 but also municipal and other governmental unit immunities.3 3 ' Though there may be some logic to
limiting liability for the exercise of government's discretionary
functions, 3 9 the scope of discretion should not include harassment
or its toleration. School districts and their officials have no
discretion to perpetrate or permit racial, sexual, or disability
harassment. 4 °
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to find that creation of
immunities from common law liability constitutes a denial of due
process under the Constitution. 4 ' Although an immunity that
would operate solely to bar causes of action pertaining to disability
Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587,599 (Kan. 1991)(upholdingverdict againstbus
company and school district for sexual molestation of student with disabilities); S.P. v. Collier
High Sch., 725 A.2d 1142,1154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (reversingdismissalofaction
against principal by student-victim of sexual harassment on school bus).
336. JERRYJ. PHILLIPS ETAL., TORT LAW 770 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that arguments in favor
of immunity for government 'are gradually losing out to better ones," such as loss of
deterrence, unfairness of shifting of losses from beneficiaries of government activity to
victims, and considerations regarding insurance availability).
337. E.g., President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Albrittonv. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867,871 (Ohio 1984).
338. See DOBBS, supra note 212, § 260, at 694 ("tIlt is now usually accepted that
government, instituted to protect and foster the well-being of citizens, should be obliged to
make good on the losses it causes by misconduct.").
339. See RICHARDA. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 22.6.2, at 624(1999) ("Although some might lament
the broad range of government activities, once that decision is made it is difficult to quarrel
with using the discretionary function exception to protect the agents of the new regulatory
state.").
340. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 548 (1988) (permitting liability under
Federal Tort Claims Act for licensing of polio vaccine in light of absence of discretion to
approve license without required test data).
341. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,283 (1980) (upholding immunity from suit
conferred on state employees).
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might be viewed as discriminatory and therefore a violation of equal
protection, 4 2 typically the relevant immunities are not so narrowly
drawn as to be vulnerable on that ground. The Supreme Court has
recently held that state defendants may assert immunity in the
state's own courts even on federal causes of action, unless the
immunity has been waived or validly abrogated.3 4 The questions of
waiver and abrogation of state sovereign immunity from federal
claims overlap with the same inquiries with regard to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit on federal claims in federal
3 44

court.

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Elementary and secondary school districts are municipal
corporations rather than arms of the state, and so Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not protect them.3 45 Nevertheless, some
public entities that provide educational services are state agencies,
such as state schools for children who are blind or deaf, and schools
on the site of state institutions for children with developmental
disabilities or mental illness. State defendants in these settings
may attempt to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity from
harassment causes of action brought in federal court. 4 6 Because so
342. Government discrimination againstpersons with disabilities mayviolate Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
447-50 (1985) (finding that zoning exclusion of group home for people with mental
retardation violated Equal Protection Clause).
343. In suits brought in state courts by private individuals, states may assert their
sovereign immunity on claims based on federal statutes, unless the sovereign immunity is
validly abrogated. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-57 (1999).
344. States are totally immune from unconsented suit in federal court on state law causes
of action. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Compare
George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-ProtectiveJurisdiction,the EleventhAmendment, and
the Powerof Congressto EnlargeFederalJurisdictionin Response to the Burger Court,71
VA. L. REV. 343 (1985) (criticizing Pennhurst),with Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate
Sphere: FederalCourts and StatePower, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1987) (defending result in
Pennhurst).
345. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977)
(finding Eleventh Amendment immunity not to bar suits against municipalities such as
school districts).
346. If suit is brought against the state officials for their own actions indirectly harassing
a student with disabilities, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not shield them. See Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991) (finding personal liability for political firings not barred
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many harassment cases concern conduct that occurred in the past
rather than ongoing conduct, 4 7 the Eleventh Amendment barrier
to retrospective monetary remedies is a serious obstacle to
enforcement of the right to be free from harassment, even in cases
of blatant or acknowledged violations of the law.34 8
The Eleventh Amendment's text appears merely to limit the
provision in Article III ofthe Constitution establishing federal court
diversity jurisdiction.3 4 9 The Amendment bars foreigners and
by immunity). Nevertheless, many state school employees do not have assets to pay a
judgment or cannot be identified. If the plaintiff claims that the state is responsible for the
conduct, the state will assert immunity, and it does not matter that state officials are sued
rather than the state or state agency itself. See Edelmanv. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)
(barring action against state official when state treasury provides source of recovery).
347. Except in very limited circumstances, federal courts retain the power to enjoin
ongoing violations of federal law under the doctrine of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
348. There is a wealth of scholarship on the Eleventh Amendment. For a valuable
collection of recent articles, see Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000).
349. Proponents of the view that the Amendment ought to be limited to this impact
include Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 195,
§ 7.3, at 396 n.1. Justice Brennan explained the position at length in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-59 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The current
majority of the Court disagrees with Justice Brennan's diversity view and holds that the
Amendment stands for abroad-ranging immunity from suit, including immunity from claims
by defendant-state citizens and immunity when the suit's jurisdictional basis is a federal
question. E.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("Although the text of the
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,
but for the presupposition... which it confirms.') (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,779 (1991)). That position is hotly disputed by four Justices. Id. at 130
(Souter, J., dissenting) (joined in dissent by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer).
Scholarship on the Eleventh Amendment generally supports the idea that the Amendment
is limited in its operation to diversity cases. E.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Marrow Construction ofan Affirmative Grant
ofJurisdictionRatherThan a ProhibitionAgainstJurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033(1983);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); see also
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24 (1989), overruledby Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Justice Brennan's opinion in Atascadero and
the works of numerous scholars have exhaustively and conclusively refuted the contention
that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of sovereign immunity to the States
.") (citation omitted). But see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989) (challenging diversity theory); William P.
Marshall, The DiversityTheory of the EleventhAmendment:A CriticalEvaluation,102 HARV.
L. REV. 1372 (1989) (same). Still another view is that the Amendment represents a broad
federal common law immunity that is nevertheless totally subject to congressional
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citizens of other states from suing a state in a federal court, and it
originated in the controversy that followed a Supreme Court case
upholding the ability of out-of-state or foreign holders of state
obligations to collect against a state government by suing in federal
court. 5 ' Under the Supreme Court's case law since 1890, however,
the Amendment has come to represent a broad immunity from
private suit in federal court that may be asserted by state
defendants. The immunity extends to suits by citizens of the state
being sued, 351 and it extends to actions when there is federal
question or another basis for jurisdiction, not just when diversity is
the reason the case is in federal court. 2
Eleventh Amendment immunity may present an obstacle to
monetary claims against state entities for harassment in the school
setting, but two doctrines are available to escape the operation of
the immunity. One is the recognized authority of Congress to
abrogate the immunity; the other is the states' own power to waive
the immunity. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,353 the Court held that
Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity if it imposes liability on states using its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the amendment's
enforcement provision. 5 4 Congress intended to act pursuant to its
Section 5 authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause when it
made the ADA and section 504 damages remedies apply to the
states. 55
abrogation. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).
350. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890) (describing history of Eleventh
Amendment); cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (enforcing debt obligation

against Georgia).
351. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 18 (holding states immune from suit by same-state citizens);
see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (reaffirming immunity of states from suit
by same-state citizens).
352. E.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64.
353. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

354. Id. at 445-46.
355. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994) (stating intention to exercise Fourteenth Amendment
power in passage ofADA); see Smithv. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,1016-18 (1984) (noting"equal
protection premise" of section 504). The statutes might also be considered exercises of
authority over interstate commerce, of course, and section 504 is also an exercise of
conditional spending power. These additional bases of authority are important with regard
to the statutes' application to nongovernmental entities, for the traditional rule has been that

1150

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1079

The Supreme Court, however, has recently placed limits on
what Congress may do under its Section 5 powers, finding in
several cases that statutes proscribed conduct too far afield from
what the Court had established were violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In each of those cases, City of Boerne v. Flores
(concerning the Religious Freedom Restoration Act),3 56 Florida
PrepaidPostsecondaryEducationExpense Boardv. College Savings
Bank (Patent Remedy Act), 5 7 United States v. Morrison (Violence
Against Women Act),35 and Kimel v. FloridaBoardofRegents (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act), 5 9 the Court found that the
statutes imposed duties that were not congruent with and
proportional to the constitutional violations they sought to remedy,
and so the Court held the statutes not to be proper exercises of
Section 5 authority.
Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled in Board of Trustees of
the UniversityofAlabama v. Garrett36 that Congress did not validly
abrogate state immunity from suit for damages in an employment
case brought under title I of the ADA. An employee brought an
action against the trustees of a state university for damages for
disability discrimination under titles I and II of the ADA and
section 504, and her case was consolidated with that of an employee
of the Alabama Department of Youth Services asserting violations
of those laws as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act. 6 1
Alabama argued that the ADA and section 504 exceeded the Section
5 power because the reach of those statutes lacks a congruence with
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit obligations to be
imposed on private actors. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
356. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
357. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
358. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
359. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
360. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a brief concurrence, and Justice Breyer dissented
in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. See supratext accompanying
notes 244-50 (discussing Garrett).

361. The Family and Medical Leave Act claim failed on the ground that it was not a valid
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power so as to permit abrogation of state immunity.
Garrett v. Univ. of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.
1999), rev'd sub nom. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
This aspect of the holding provoked a dissenting opinion. Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1220-35 (Cook,
J., dissenting).
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and proportionality to the violations of the Fourteenth Amendment
that they seek to remedy. The court of appeals, however, found for
the employees, relying on an earlier holding, 6 2 which concluded
that in enacting the ADA, Congress acted on the basis of ample
evidence ofpurposeful unequal treatment of people with disabilities
by state and local government, and thus the congressional response
was within its powers under Section 5.63 The Garrett court
extended that holding to section 504, relying on similar evidence
that Congress sought to remedy and prevent violations of equal
protection. 64
The Supreme Court reversed. 65 It restricted its decision to
employment claims against states under title I of the ADA,
however, dismissing certiorari on the question whether employees

may sue their state employers for damages under title JI.6' As
described above in connection with Garrett's treatment of equal
protection, the Court reasoned that mere rational-basis scrutiny
applies to Fourteenth Amendment claims of disability discrimination by state government, so special accommodations are not
constitutionally required.3 6 7 The Court found there was no
congressional identification of a pattern of unconstitutional
employment discrimination against people with disabilities by the
states, and that the provisions of the statute were not proportional
to and congruent with the constitutional violations. 6 ' According to
the Court, not only does title rs outlawing of failure to provide
reasonable accommodation exceed the constitutional duty, but also
its forbidding of practices that create unjustified disparate impacts
on people with disabilities exceeds barring the kinds of intentional
conduct that violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
362. Ironically, the holding was the other half of the Kimel case, in which the employee
sued under the ADA for the same conduct that was the basis of the ADEA claim. Kimel, 139
F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), affd, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
363. Garrett,193 F.3d at 1218.
364. Id. at 1218-19.
365. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356.
366. Id. at 360 n.1. The Court apparently did not view the section 504 issue as covered by
the grant of certiorari, for it did not mention it at all.
367. See id. at 367. Garrett'simplications for equal protection claims based on disability
discrimination are discussed supra text accompanying notes 244-50.
368. Garrett,531 U.S. at 369-72. The Court also stressed that private individuals remain
free to enforce title I against states in actions for injunctive relief. Id. at 374 n.9.
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The impact of the case remains uncertain because of the Court's
reservation of decision regarding title 11.319 The Court distinguished
the record of violations relating to employment from that relating
to state and local governmental services in general, where
discrimination was more heavily documented. 70 It is this latter
arena-including services to children in schools operated by state
and local government-that title II governs. The Court has on more
than one occasion suggested that at least a denial of minimum
access to a meaningful education violates equal protection,3 71 and
as noted above, constitutional claims exist under multiple theories
for disability harassment in school, so a damages remedy for that
constitutional deprivation would pass muster under Garrett's
approach.
As a more general matter, Garrett'semphasis on the reasonableaccommodation obligation of title I and its discussion of title I's
prohibition of practices with disparate impacts raise the negative
inference that when state conduct actually does amount to a
constitutional violation, a statute may provide a cause of action that
abrogates state immunity. In other words, when the ADA provides
a remedy for government mistreatment that is motivated by
hostility against people with disabilities or by fear and stereotypes
that meet constitutional standards of intentionality, it is a
369. One of the first commentaries on the case predicted that the Court would bar
damages claims under title II as well, but did not give reasons for the forecast. Linda
Greenhouse, JusticesGive the StatesImmunity FromSuits byDisabled Workers, N.Y. THmEs,
Feb. 22, 2001, at 1. Greenhouse wrote:
The justices will soon consider whether to take up a state immunity claim
under the section of the Americans With Disabilities Act that requires
government agencies to make their services, programs and activities accessible
to people with disabilities .... Under the analysis the court applied today, there
is every reason to suppose that the justices will find the states immune from
suit under this section as well as the employment section.
Id. As indicated in the text, title II merits different treatment and at least some title II
claims, such as those based on harassment, clearly support abrogation of immunity from
damages. See infra text accompanying notes 371-72.
370. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 371 & n.7.
371. Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-59 (1973) (finding
no equal protection violation in unequal school resources in light of absence of absolute
deprivation of education), with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding violation of equal
protection in exclusion of illegal alien children from public school), and Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974) (finding absence of Chinese language instruction to violate title VI of Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
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congressional enforcement measure that is proportional to, and
congruent with, the prohibition in the Constitution. Disability
harassment is precisely the kind of intentional conduct motivated
by hostility or the desire to subordinate that exceeds the standard
established in Cleburne for an equal protection violation.
To make the comparison to Cleburne more precise, not only do
the state officials deny the permit to the group home, but they then
humiliate or abuse the would-be residents or they are deliberately
indifferent when those under their control do so. No matter whether
Cleburne is viewed as a rational-basis case or something more, it
established that the Equal Protection Clause forbids conduct that
lacks any sensible justification and that works harm on a defined
class of people with disabilities. There is no justification for
harassment under any constitutional standard. Garrettdoes not bar
a damages remedy under the ADA in that case, one far different
under the Court's analysis.72 from a reasonable-accommodation-in31 3
employment claim.
Harassment claims maybe brought under section 504 and IDEA
as well as the ADA. Both section 504 and IDEA are exercises of
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority,3 7 4 but states might
372. As noted, supranote 248 (discussing accommodations), an approach other than that
of the Courts might view the failure to accommodate less charitably and find it the product
ofstereotypes about disability and the impact ofthe environment on disability. One does not
need to adopt such an approach to consider harassment to be within the core of the conduct
barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.
373. While concluding that ADA title II generally exceeds the scope of congressional
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Circuit has ruled that
monetary remedies under the title are congruent with and proportional to the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment, if damages are permitted only in cases where there is
discriminatry animus or ill will based on the plaintiffs disability. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health
Sciences Ctr., No. 00-9223,2001 WL 1159970, at*8 (2d Cir. Sept. 26,2001). So limited, title
II money claims against states comport with congressional power under Section 5 and are
not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at *9 ("Government actions based on
discriminatory animus or ill will towards the disabled are generally the same actions that
are proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment,-i.e., conduct that is based on irrational
prejudice or wholly lacking a legitimate government interest."). The Second Circuit's
interpretation of Eleventh Amendment immunity would thus permit damages against state
entities for intentional wrongdoing such as disability harassment.
374. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1019 (1984) (finding "equal protection premise"
behind both statute now designated as IDEA and section 504); Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d
1397, 1407 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding statute now designated as IDEA to be valid exercise of
power under Fourteenth Amendment).
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raise the same question they have raised regarding the ADA about
whether the statutes exceed that power. For the same reasons that
the ADA is within Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power, at
least with regard to harassment claims against states, so too
section 504 and IDEA are proper uses of the authority. Even if the
Supreme Court were ultimately to disagree with those arguments,
however, section 504 and IDEA would be constitutionally proper
exercises of congressional power under the Spending Clause. 75
The spending for which the two statutes provide is for the
general welfare, and the conditions that they impose are not
coercive; a state may decline the money if it wishes. 76 In the last
seventy years, the Court has not found a single federal statute
unconstitutional on the ground that it exceeded the scope of that
3 77
authority.
The successful defense of the statutes as exercises of spending
power has consequences for the Eleventh Amendment immunity
analysis regarding waiver. Althoughthe Court has previouslyfound
that the mere assertion of a claim for violation of a spending-power
statute under section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity from damages liability,3 78 it has always affirmed that
state governments may waive the immunity.7 9 Acceptance of
375. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding section 504 to be
proper exercise of spending power); Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th
Cir. 1999) (finding IDEA to be valid exercise of spending power), vacated on other grounds,
Jim C. v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999).
376. See Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1082 ("The sacrifice of all federal education funds ... would
be politically painful, but we cannot say that it compels Arkansas's choice.").
377. The Court rejected a challenge to a spending-clause statute in South Dakotav. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987), and although dicta in that case suggest that there might be some limits
on Congress's spending power, the restrictions pose no threat to section 504 or IDEA. See id.
at 207-08 (describing possible limits on spending power); see also Leonard, supranote 234,
at 180-83 (detailing how section 504 meets South Dakota v. Dole standards).
378. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (upholding Eleventh Amendment immunity
in case brought under Social Security Act and section 1983). This rule was extended to
section 504 inAtascaderoState Hospitalv. Scanlon,473 U.S. 234(1985). Congress responded
to the Atascadero decision by enacting an abrogation of immunity for section 504 suits. See
Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)). Similarly, Congress prospectively overruledDellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223
(1989), which found that the statute that is now IDEA did not clearly abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity, by enacting an explicit abrogation. See Pub. L. No. 101-476,104 Stat.
1103, 1106 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1403 (2000)).
379. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Coim'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
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federal funds after Congress enacted a clear abrogation of'immunity
in section 504 and IDEA3 80 is a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
mmunty.38 1 The state knowingly relinquishes immunity from suit
in federal court for damages in exchange for the federal money that
is provided subject to the relinquishment.

IV. TAING DISABILITY HARASSMENT SERIOUSLY
School personnel, parents, and others should act voluntarily to
establish a climate in which harassment is not tolerated, 8 2 but the
legal system operates as the ultimate tool to ensure equal
participation in school without harassment for children with
disabilities.8 ' Taking disability harassment seriously and acting to
stop it will be, as far as the legal system is concerned, a matter of
claims and remedies, and a matter of defenses to liability.

380. The Eighth Circuit found the exaction of the waivers clear and unambiguous. Jim C.,
235 F.3d at 1081 ("The Rehabilitation Act requires States that accept federal funds to waive
their Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits brought in federal court for violations of
Section 504."); Bradley, 189 F.3d at 753 ("When it enacted §§ 1403 and 1415, Congress
provided a clear, unambiguous warning of its intent to condition a state's participation in the
IDEA program and its receipt of federal IDEA funds on the state's waiver of its immunity
from suit in federal court on claims made under the IDEA.").
381. See Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1080; Bradley, 189 F.3d at 753 (finding that receipt of funds
waives immunity from liability for violations of IDEA), vacated on other grounds, Jim C. v.
Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267,
1271 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding waiver ofimmunity under section 504 by acceptance of federal
funds); see also Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting in case
for nonmonetary relief that receipt of funds after statutory abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity may work as waiver of immunity). ContraGarcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health
Scis. Ctr., No. 00-9223, 2001 WL 1159970, at *11 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2001) (holding waiver
ineffective on theory that state would have assumed immunity validly abrogated, and thus
failed to make knowing decision).
382. An effective program to combat harassment includes establishing policies against
offensive conduct, training staff and students about harassment, encouraging persons who
have been harassed to make reports, investigating reports thoroughly and promptly, and
disciplining effectively all those who engage in harassment. See, e.g., Steven D. Baderian et
at, ManagingEmployment Risks in Light of the New Rulings in Sexual HarassmentLaw,
21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 364-67 (1999) (describing steps to prevent and respond to
workplace sexual harassment).
383. Cf Weber, supranote 248, at 136 (describing operation of ADA in employment cases
as effort to change "the calculus of employers' self-interest" through threat of liability).
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A. Claims and Remedies
There is no shortage of legal claims that may be brought for
disability harassment. The disability discrimination statutes, the
special education laws, the common law, and the Constitution all
impose duties to avoid harassment and stop tolerating it. What is
needed, however, is a serious response that will actually have an
impact on the behavior of school systems, express society's
disapproval of the behavior, and make the victims whole for their
humiliation.
This response must come in the form of damages."8 4 Accordingly,
the legal theories that matter are those establishing violations of
section 504 and title II with a sufficient showing of intent to
support an award of damages; or violations of IDEA and the
Constitution made actionable under section 1983, supporting an
award of damages; or common law causes of action that support
awards of damages.
The legal developments to arrive at these results are in place.
Many courts have recognized the causes of action. The intent
requirement, though it may be an obstacle in some cases, is hardly
an insurmountable one. 85 The analogy to teacher and peer sex
harassment cases, which establishes that damages liability exists
if school officials are deliberately indifferent to known acts of
harassment, provides a workable standard for a large number of
cases. 386 Individual liability under the common law or constitutional
theories, supported with direct evidence or other means of showing
intent, will come to the fore in others. Common law remedies will
be a backstop if other means fail.
B. Defenses
The pattern of cases suggests that developing means of
surmounting defenses is even more important than developing the
underlying claims. To take disability harassment seriously and
treat it properly, courts need to excuse exhaustion of administrative
384. See supratext accompanying notes 122-60, 224-28.
385. See supratext accompanying notes 124-46.
386. See supratext accompanying notes 113-21, 142-45.
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remedies. The theory is in place. Only compensatory damages are
an adequate remedy for harassment, but compensatory damages
are not available through the administrative process under IDEA.28
Accordingly, neither the special education statute's language nor
any sensible construction of congressional intent supports the
imposition of an exhaustion requirement.
Qualified immunity defenses depend on whether disability
harassment violates an established right about which the defendant
should have known.3 88 By now, any potential defendant should
know enough not to personally engage in harassing conduct, and
not to be deliberately indifferent to known harassment engaged in
by those under his or her supervision, be they employees or
students. The wiser judicial opinions recognize this reality. Sober
consideration of the nature of harassment and the harms it
produces should influence other courts to join those that have
reached the conclusion that immunity is not available under those
circumstances.
General governmental immunity and its applicability depend on
state legislators' decisions about whose interests are more
important-those who hold the localities' checkbooks or those who
are victims of illegal, harmful conduct. Eleventh Amendment
immunity depends on the decisions of e thoroughly divided group
of nine, but the reasoning of even those who support immunity in
many circumstances does not support an overturning of the
abrogation of the immunity worked by title II of the ADA in
harassment cases. 89 Still less would it place any obstacle in the
path of waiver of the immunity under section 504.90
CONCLUSION
As an agenda for law reform, the doctrinal developments
suggested above are modest indeed. They consist simply of following
the better-reasoned precedents in connection with liability,
remedies, and defenses for disability harassment. If those modest
387.
388.
389.
390.

See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
See supra text accompanying notes 318-19.
See supra text accompanying notes 369-73.
See supra text accompanying notes 374-81.
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steps are taken, the courts will begin to give a serious, effective
judicial response to the social problem of disability harassment in
the public schools.

